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Abstract 
Due to outsourcing and specialization, supply chains have become more extensive and 
complex, leaving them more susceptible to risk. Consequently, researchers and business 
practitioners alike have realized the need to manage risk outside the context of the firm, thus 
giving rise to Supply Chain Risk Management.  
Despite the realization that risk can originate at any level of the supply chain and have 
repercussions throughout the chain; the mode of research within Supply Chain Risk 
Management has been centered on dyadic buyer-supplier relationships. Due to this, there is 
a considerable research gap within the field of Supply Chain Risk Management regarding 
risk originating beyond first-tier suppliers.   
This research aims to generate new knowledge about Supply Chain Risk Management 
beyond first-tier suppliers, and contribute to closing the research gap by asking, “How can 
focal organizations manage supply chain risk beyond first-tier suppliers?” The research is 
focused on non-financial risk related to the upstream supplier of the focal organization. 
 
The research was organized as an exploratory multiple-case study, and the cases were 
selected based on a theoretical replication logic. The data collection consisted of semi-
structured interviews with key personnel in each case company.  
Analysis of the interview transcripts revealed that although all case-companies recognized 
that their supply chain risk partly consisted of risk related to sub-suppliers; few had a 
framework for managing it.  
 
The main findings of this research include that the dependency of buying organizations on 
its first tier supplier can determine whether it is possible to conduct supply chain risk 
management efforts, and that visibility is the foundation for effective risk management in 
the supply chain. Based on our findings and extant theory within power dependence we 
identify four scenarios that firms may find themselves in regarding their relationship with 
tier-one supplier, and its implications for supply chain risk Management beyond first-tier 
suppliers. The four scenarios are control, cooperation, dependency and trusting. Overall, the 
study provides both theoretical contributions and actionable managerial implications. In 
addition, six avenues for future research are identified. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter contextualizes the thesis subject, shows the existence of a research gap regarding 
SCRM beyond tier-one suppliers and provides insight as to why closing said research gap is 
necessary. Our research objectives are clarified, and the research questions utilized to 
examine the subject are presented, along with an explanation as to why they are fruitful for 
elucidating SCRM. 
1.2 Background for the thesis 
Due to specialization, outsourcing and global sourcing, supply chains have become more 
fragmented and complex (Christopher and Peck 2004). As the length and complexity of supply 
chains are recognized to have an impact on performance, cost, quality, responsiveness and 
resilience (Skilton and Robinson 2009) academics and professionals have realized the need for 
a new management discipline aimed at targeting the challenges and opportunities presented by 
this novel organizational reality. To manage this shift, Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
emerged as a discipline within the management sciences. 
 
Within the confides of the focal organization, companies can largely manage strategy and 
internal risk issues with traditional risk- and operation management tools. When introducing a 
second upstream supply chain echelon however, the tools and tactics at the company’s disposal 
change, as the complexity increases and the focal company has a harder time influencing their 
supplier’s managerial decisions. Still, Supply Chain Risk (SCR) can be managed through the 
company’s sourcing strategy, Service Level Agreements (SLA) and various mutually beneficial 
cooperative efforts. 
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Figure 1: The sphere of influence by Supply-Chain separation. (Own Production). 
 
In the same way that companies use different tactics and tools to manage risk in a dyadic setting 
as opposed to when fully integrated upstream, it stands to reason that there may be a different 
approach to managing SCR relating to subsequent lower-tier suppliers. This area has not 
received adequate attention in research, as most literature that includes the possibility for 
disruption in supply focuses on single facilities or pairs of echelons in a supply chain (Schmitt 
and Singh 2012;Yu and Goh 2014). 
 
The existence of this research gap is peculiar because risk originating from beyond the first-tier 
supplier is not inconsequential or less detrimental than those occurring further downstream in 
the supply chain. In fact, the failure of any node in the supply chain could imply a failure of the 
entire supply network (Bakshi and Kleindorfer 2009). 
 
As the field of SCRM matures and research gaps are filled, more comprehensive and integrated 
models are likely to provide managers with better framework for SCRM, thus allowing 
increased understanding of the risk elements in their supply chains and more precise tools for 
managing them.  Hence, analyzing SCR can provide organizations with a more nuanced and 
proper decision basis, as it can elicit complexities and potential obstacles along the chain the 
focal company is embedded in. 
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1.3 Research objectives- and questions 
 Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to explore how a focal firm in the supply chain can manage 
SCR related to suppliers beyond the first-tier. 
This study contributes to this field of research by exploring the extant literature combined with 
a qualitative research design conducted through a multiple case study, supplemented by a 
document analysis of buyer-supplier contracts and Codes of Conduct (CoC). In doing so, our 
research contribute with a more holistic understanding of SCRM by uncovering the strategies, 
tools and tactics used to manage SCR beyond first-tier suppliers, as well as their determinants. 
 
 
 Questions 
To elucidate the main research problem a set of relevant and fruitful research questions are 
developed. Each of the research questions contribute towards gaining a broad and holistic 
understanding of the main issue.  
 
Do managers know the identity of their company’s sub-suppliers? If so, do they have 
intricate knowledge about their operations? 
This question is relevant because if managers are not able to appropriately identify and evaluate 
the risk-elements in their supply chain, then they will not be able to manage them. One key 
element this research question seek to clarify is the concept of “visibility”, described by Jüttner 
(2005) in his study about SCRM requirements from a business practitioners perspective as 
being “widely acknowledged by focus groups” and “less for organizations beyond the first 
tier”- (Jüttner 2005.p 135). 
 
How do buying organizations assess risks beyond tier-one suppliers?  
The second research question aims to provide information on whether the organization 
systematically maps and assess SCR and of how this process is undertaken. Through this line 
of inquiry, we investigate whether there exists in-use methods and strategies for risk assessment 
that are previously undescribed/under-researched in SCRM literature. Furthermore, when and 
if applicable, these are incorporated into the proposed framework.  
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How do buying organizations monitor the performance of suppliers beyond tier-one 
(subcontractors)? 
When a risk element in the supply chain has been identified, assessed and measures have been 
implemented, monitoring is the next step in the risk management process (Blackhurst, Scheibe, 
and Johnson 2008). Without monitoring the performance of suppliers, the buying organization 
has limited information about whether the subcontractors fulfill their obligations, or whether 
implemented efforts are producing the desired results.  
Hence, this research question aims to discover whether monitoring procedures exist, and 
whether such procedures are undertaken by the buying organization, third-party monitoring 
services, or by the subcontractor themselves in the form of self-reporting.  
 
What are the challenges of managing risks beyond tier-one suppliers? 
Through literature studies, we find what researchers and academics deem to be the most 
important challenges within SCRM, however without giving practitioners enough space to 
voice their opinion, we can only understand one of many realities. Investigating 
professionals/practitioners’ perceptions of the challenges of managing risk beyond tier-one 
suppliers should not be neglected. After all, they make decisions and manage the involved 
processes.  
How do buying organizations address these challenges? 
To gain a holistic understanding of how buying organizations manage SCR it is not sufficient 
to look at how they manage specific risk-elements. We also need to understand how they 
counteract or mitigate the barriers and challenges to manage risk. Examples of such barriers 
could include lacking visibility, supply chain misalignment, cultural differences or 
geographical distance.  
 
 Chapter summary and structure of the thesis 
This chapter has provided the context of the thesis subject and has presented the research gap 
regarding SCRM beyond tier-one suppliers. Furthermore, the chapter has justified why closing 
the said research gap is necessary. 
5 
 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2: Containing literature reviews of 
SCRM, risk management and SCM as well as the theoretical framework. Chapter 3: Research 
Methodology, including justification of all methodological decisions as well as validity- and 
reliability evaluations. Chapter 4: Findings from the case-companies and an aggregated analysis 
of the findings.  Chapter 5: A discussions about our findings, and how they fit into extant theory. 
Chapter 6: Research summary, theoretical- and managerial implications and limitations of the 
study. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter is separated into two main sections. “Background of the field” which present the 
background of SCRM as a field, and examine relevant literature from both SCRM, SCM and 
risk management. Secondly, “Theoretical framework” which focus on specific elements within 
SCRM, and theoretical lenses through which to examine them. Relevant critique of the theories 
used are also included in order for the reader to make their own assessment of their applicability.  
Furthermore, we explore how different literature and researchers define risk, and determine the 
scope of our own definition. 
2.2 Background of the field 
This research draws on peer- reviewed journal articles originating from several different 
academic fields. The main ones being SCM, Risk Management, and SCRM. The latter is most 
closely related to our research, however, many of the concepts within SCRM derives from the 
former two and utilizing certain frameworks from these fields may therefore be fruitful. In this 
chapter, we provide an overview of relevant literature within all three fields and explain its 
pertinence to our research.  
 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical background of Supply Chain Risk Management (Own production) 
 Supply Chain Management 
The last couple of decades, the SCM field has become increasingly popular. There has been a 
significant increase in academic research, conferences and university courses related to SCM 
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(Burgess, Singh, and Koroglu 2006). However, SCM as a research field has not succeeded in 
creating an own theoretical base, but has instead borrowed from other disciplines such as 
economics, management, sociology and psychology (Carter 2011). Due to its multidisciplinary 
origin, there have been many attempts to define SCM, but none has become universal (Mehmeti 
2016). Mentzer et al. (2001) argue that it is possible to develop a universal and encompassing 
definition of SCM. 
 
 Mentzer et al. (2001a) defined SCM as “the systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional 
business functions and the tactics across these business functions within a particular company 
and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purposes of improving the long-term 
performance of the individual companies and the supply chain as a whole”- (Mentzer et al. 
2001 p. 141). 
 
Christopher and Peck (2004) defined it as “The network of organizations that are involved, 
through upstream and downstream linkages, in the different processes and activities that 
produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of the ultimate consumer”- 
(Christopher and Peck 2004 p. 2).  
 
Based on the aforementioned definitions there seems to be a consensus that the modern business 
is no longer competing as a single entity, but rather as a part of an inter-organizational network. 
The success of a company therefore depends on the ability to integrate the company in a 
network of business relationships (Lambert, Cooper, and Pagh 1998). A possible pitfall for 
SCM is that the scope becomes so broad it encompasses too many functional areas thus losing 
its identity and focus (Ballou 2007). 
 
According to Lambert, Cooper, and Pagh (1998) “SCM deals with total business process 
excellence and represents a new way of managing the business and relationship with other 
members of the supply chain”- (Lambert, Cooper, and Pagh 1998 p.1). 
 
Although SCM promotes collaboration and strategic coordination across businesses in the 
supply chain, to improve long-term performance and relationship between the individual 
company and the supply chain, the actual practicing of SCM takes place to a very limited 
degree. It is more likely that the management of the supply chain is practiced between the focal 
company and first-tier suppliers, while tasks concerning other tiers beyond that first-tier does 
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not fulfill the envisioned theoretical scope for SCM (Ballou 2007). According to Ballou (2007) 
the majority of firms today practice SCM as logistics, but argues that when the techniques and 
tools to achieve the proposed benefits of SCM are better documented and measured, managers 
will begin to practice SCM.  
 
Applying literature from the SCM discipline allows us to gain knowledge in how businesses 
behave in a supply chain network. Since management of businesses and relationships in a 
supply chain is within our research questions scope, we deem it useful to broaden our 
understanding of the topic. 
 
 Risk Management 
Similar to the development within the SCM field, risk management issues have also gained 
academic attention from different literature streams, such as economics, strategic management, 
international management and finance. In recent years, there has also emerged a growing 
literature in risk management within the logistics field. Risk management has become an 
important topic in SCM (Narasimhan and Talluri 2009), but SCRM from an academic 
viewpoint is still in its infancy (Jüttner 2005).  
This view has been substantiated by later research, with petitions for more case studies 
regarding how companies assess and perceive SCR (Lavastre, Gunasekaran, and Spalanzani 
2012). Claims of lacking empirical academic research has been heightened (Sodhi, Son, and 
Tang 2012; Vilko, Ritala, and Hallikas 2016). The need for broader perspectives and 
understanding (Hughes et al. 2015), and the need for more systemic and holistic approaches to 
the subject is therefore needed (Bonsall et al. 2019). All of this support Jüttner (2005)’s 
argument that there still exists a research gap for risk management within the SCM discipline. 
  
The increased focus on risk management derives from several different trends in the global 
business market. This includes collaboration across borders, strategic outsourcing, new 
technology, shorter product life cycle, offshoring and shorter lead times. While some of these 
new strategies pave the way to new possibilities, they also increase the probability of external 
events interfering with the daily business operations (Narasimhan and Talluri 2009). There have 
been multiple incidents where disruptions further upstream, has severely affected companies 
downstream. When US shut down 29 of their ports because of a labour dispute in 2002, not 
only did Toyota and Nissan have to stop their production, there was real concern that it could 
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send the whole East-Asian region into a recession (Simpson 2002). Thus, the new global trend 
offers organizations new strategic choices and opportunities, but organizations must also take 
into consideration the increased risk and vulnerability they open themselves up to, and the 
potential economic losses that comes with it (Narasimhan and Talluri 2009). Most business are 
aware of these risks, and many seek to manage them through e.g. formal risk audits, however 
the definition of risk is fairly limited (Jüttner 2005). When dealing with risk management in a 
supply chain, not only must the company assess their own vulnerabilities in a supply chain, they 
must also map out which direct risk can disrupt their own operations, and identify the risk that 
emerge as a result of linkages between different businesses in the supply chain as a whole 
(Jüttner 2005).  
Assessing and identifying risks and their consequences can be a daunting task for a single 
organization. It might be feasible to identify tier-one supplier risks, but it becomes more 
complex and expensive to analyse tier-two’s supplier risk and exposure (Jüttner 2005).  
 
Since our research questions concern aspects related to risk beyond tier-one suppliers, we 
incorporate literature regarding risk management, to see whether existing risk management 
strategies can be deployed and adapted to usage beyond the first-tier.  
 
 Supply Chain Risk Management 
SCRM is a relatively new field of academic study, which nevertheless has garnered extensive 
attention in later years (Rao and Goldsby 2009). Colicchia and Strozzi's (2012) study of citation 
networks within SCRM recognize Kogut and Kulatilaka's (1994) publication on operational 
flexibility as the field’s inception. This view is contested by Tang and Nurmaya Musa (2011), 
who considers the first SCRM publications to emerge in 1997. Early studies within the field of 
SCRM (e.g. Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994; Huchzermeier and Cohen 1996), tends to follow the 
conceptual understanding that “risk” is equivalent to variations in the external factors affecting 
the supply chain. 
 
While this view is still present within the field of SCRM, the works of Chapman et al. 2002; 
Christopher and Peck 2004; C. S. Tang 2006, have contributed towards extending the concept 
of SCR to include disruption-risk and supply-risk. Companies no longer compete as a single 
entity, but are part of an inter-organizational supply network, therefore, the focus on SCRM 
should also be managed from an inter-organizational perspective (Pujawan and Geraldin 2009). 
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Jansson and Norrman (2004) argues that understanding the devastating effects, and knowing 
how to avoid disasters or even minor supply chain disruptions is the main focus of SCRM. 
While Pujawan and Geraldin (2009) claims that increasing resilience, reducing the probability 
of risk events occurring, and the organizations ability to recover from a disruption is the aim of 
SCRM. Within proactive SCRM, collaboration, integration and cooperation are key concepts 
for reducing SCR (Colicchia and Strozzi 2012; Jüttner 2005 and Kleindorfer and Saad 2005). 
Within these fields, our research makes use of Li et al. (2015) and Wiengarten et al's (2016) 
findings on the effects of “information-sharing” and “risk-sharing” to evaluate SCRM efforts.  
 
This thesis derives from and apply to the frameworks and definitions described in these articles 
for the development of theory and interpretation of our results. Jansson and Norrman's (2004) 
case study of Ericsson’s SCRM approach serves as an inspiration in terms of reactive-and risk 
mitigating efforts. This case study is particularly relevant to our study of risk management 
beyond tier-one suppliers because Ericsson’s SCRM approach was designed as a direct result 
of a supply disruption caused by an incident at the sub-supplier level (Jansson and Norrman 
2004).  
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Some of the recent, relevant and influential publications on SCRM are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Relevant SCRM literature 
Author Title Objective Main findings 
(Revilla and 
Saenz 2017) 
The Impact of risk 
management on the 
frequency of supply 
chain disruptions. A 
configurational 
approach 
 
Developing a configurational 
model of SCRM beyond 
reactive internal responses. 
Interorganizational cooperation reduces the frequency 
of supply chain disruptions. 
(C. S. Tang 
2006) 
Perspectives in 
supply chain risk 
management 
Reviewing quantitative 
models for SCRM, and 
comparing strategies from 
literature with actual 
practice. 
Current SCRM models are designed for managing 
operational risk. Not disruptions. 
(Li et al. 
2015) 
Joint supply chain 
risk management: 
An agency and 
collaboration 
perspective 
Determining the effect of risk 
information sharing and risk 
sharing mechanism in 
improving financial 
performance. 
Both risk information sharing and risk-sharing 
mechanism positively influences financial 
performance. The effectiveness of risk sharing 
increases with relationship length and supplier trust, 
while the effectiveness of risk sharing mechanism is 
increased by shared SCRM understanding. 
 
(O. Tang and 
Nurmaya 
Musa 2011) 
Identifying risk 
issues and research 
advancements in 
supply chain risk 
management 
Investigating recent research 
developments in SCRM and 
identifying research gaps. 
 
 
 
There is a lack of research on information flow risk 
and proactive SCRM strategies. 
(Tse et al. 
2011) 
Quality risk in 
global supply 
network 
Exploring the issue of quality 
and safety in global sourcing 
and developing SCRM 
framework for reducing 
quality risk. 
 
Supply chain visibility and strategic sourcing can 
reduce the impact of quality risk in multi-tier supply 
chains. 
(Wiengarten 
et al. 2016) 
Risk, risk 
management 
practices and the 
success of supply 
chain integration 
Exploring the role of risk and 
risk management in the 
success of supply chain 
integration. 
Integration is effective in both high- and low-risk 
scenarios.  
(Nguyen et 
al. 2017) 
Developing 
visibility to mitigate 
supplier risk: the 
role of power 
dependence 
structure 
 
Developing a model to build 
supply chain visibility. 
Visibility can be an important tool for mitigating 
supplier risk. The importance of visibility increases 
with the degree of the dependence the buyer has in its 
supplier.  
(Sodhi, Son, 
and Tang 
2012) 
Researchers 
perspective on 
supply chain risk 
management 
Gaining a better 
understanding from the 
research community on the 
scope and methods of 
SCRM. 
There is no clear consensus on the definition of 
SCRM, a lack of commensurate research on the 
response to supply chain incidents and a shortage of 
research on SCRM in general.  
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Although there are many publications that aim to provide a collaborative approach, speak of 
integration and supply chain approaches, from Table 1 we see that researchers do not separate 
between different tiers in the supply chain when it comes to SCRM. Hence, the idea that 
different tiers of the supply chain may require differentiated risk mitigation- and prevention 
strategies is absent from academic discourse, indicating a research gap on SCRM beyond first-
tier suppliers. 
 
2.3 Theoretical framework 
This section describes the theoretical frameworks and concepts relevant to SCRM beyond first-
tier suppliers in more detail. 
 Defining risk 
Risk management in supply chains has become an important topic in the SCM field due to 
multiple industry trends such as outsourcing, globalization, new innovative technology and 
reliance on specialized suppliers (Narasimhan and Talluri 2009). Because of these trends, there 
has been an increase in the magnitude and potential of SCR. The term “risk” does not have a 
widely accepted definition (Freise and Seuring 2015). 
 
 Pfohl, Köhler, and Thomas (2010) defines SCR as “Risks that can be attributed to disturbance 
of flow within the goods, information, and financial network, as well as the social and 
institutional networks. They might have negative effect on the goal achievement of single 
companies and the whole supply chain, respectively, with regard to end customer value, costs, 
time or quality”- (Pfohl, Köhler, and Thomas 2010 p.35). 
 
Another definition is provided by Nguyen et al. (2017), who refer to SCR as “buyer’s 
expectation of probable disruption on the supplier’s side that causes loss to the buyer due to 
unavailability of a sourced item”- (Nguyen et al. 2017 p.70). 
 
Traditionally, risk is viewed as potential economic loss or chances, but in recent years, a broader 
perspective has emerged. With the newer perspective, risk is understood as an effect that hinders 
corporations to accomplish their goals and objectives (Freise and Seuring 2015).  
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Having established that there are many different forms of “risk”, we find it pertinent to specify 
which types are in focus, and which are excluded. Therefore, when we write about risk in our 
master thesis, we do not refer to the inherent risk of for example uncertain customer demand or 
price/currency fluctuations, but rather upstream disruption risk, quality risk and social risk 
within the supply chain. 
 
 For the concept of disruption risk, we follow Tang's (2006) definition; “Disruption risks are 
referred to as the major disruptions caused by natural and man-made disasters such as 
earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, terrorist attacks, etc., or economic crises such as currency 
evaluation or strikes” (C. S. Tang 2006b. p.453).  
 
The increased length and complexity of a supply chain adds extra quality risks and 
considerations for organizations, and makes it increasingly difficult to assure the quality of 
products (Romano and Vinelli 2001). The final quality level the customer receives depends on 
the quality management practices of each node in a supply chain; hence, each member of the 
supply chain is contributing to the quality level (Romano and Vinelli 2001). Any failure in 
noticing quality breaches may affect the companies in terms of customer complaints, a tarnished 
reputation or product recalls, therefore, knowing how to handle and prevent quality risks from 
reaching the customers are crucial (Tse et al. 2018). 
 
 Social issues/risks in the supply chain are defined as “product- or process-related aspects of 
operations that affect human safety, welfare and community development” (Klassen and 
Vereecke 2012. p.103.). Adding to this definition, we find it pertinent to include the potential 
negative PR-and reputational effects related to a breach in these product- or process aspects in 
our definition of social risk.   
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 Visibility 
The pertinence of “visibility” to managing SCR beyond the first-tier is that one cannot manage 
the risk of an entity whose existence is unknown, and neither choose an effective approach of 
doing so without knowledge of its operations. 
 
Supply Chain Visibility (SCV) can be defined as the degree to which supply chain partners 
have access to information related to supply chain operations and management, and how this is 
considered to benefit each other (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Barratt and Oke 2007). When 
discussing visibility in supply chains beyond the first-tier, we find it pertinent to include another 
aspect to this definition, namely whether a focal firm has rudimentary knowledge about its sub-
suppliers. The notion that one supply chain entity should not know the name and function of 
one of its supply chain members might appear strange to the reader, however due to sub-
contracting and the general complexity of modern supply chains many companies can only 
guess the number (and names) of their indirect suppliers (Webb 2018). 
 
There is no unique and uniformly accepted definition of visibility (Caridi et al. 2010). Some 
publications focus on the quality and accuracy of the data made available e.g. Closs, Goldsby, 
and Clinton (1997) and Gustin, Daugherty, and Stank (1995). This view is also relevant for our 
thesis; however, we consider it to belong under “information sharing” rather than visibility. 
Figure 3: The visibility frontier and its potential effect on risk detection” represents a 
hypothetical supply chain for a product, with the visibility frontier signalizing the buying firm’s 
knowledge about its supply chain partners. 
 
 
Figure 3: The visibility frontier and its potential effect on risk detection 
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As shown by Figure 3: The visibility frontier and its potential effect on risk detection”, with a 
visibility frontier of “Tier 1”, the buyer only knows of its immediate suppliers, while “Tier 2” 
entails that it knows its sub-suppliers. By means of the hypothetical scenario presented below, 
the effects of this is explained further. 
 
Scenario:  
 
Bartlett, Julien, and Baines (2007) investigated the effects of visibility on supply chain 
performance and joint initiatives by using Lamming and Caldwell (2001)’s transparency 
framework. Their findings indicate that there were significant improvements in vis-à-vis 
schedule adherence and overall performance of the supply chain (Bartlett, Julien, and Baines 
2007).  
 
“In order to reduce the risk of a disruption stopping the flow of goods, the buyer 
chooses to adopt a dual sourcing strategy, sourcing 50% of its supply for their product 
from “Supplier X” and 50% from “Supplier Y”. Believing they have reduced risk to an 
acceptable level, the buyer continues its day-to-day operations.  
One day, the deliveries of products from both Supplier X- and Y subsides. Upon request, 
both suppliers blame the missed deliveries on their own supplier of raw materials. In 
response to this, the buyer realizes the need for more extensive knowledge of their 
supply chain, maps it out, and extends the visibility frontier to “Tier 2”. After doing so 
they realize that both their suppliers purchase 100% of their material from the same 
supplier, namely “Sub-supplier Z”. 
“Figure 3: The visibility frontier and its potential effect on risk detection” teaches us 
two things. Firstly, that extending the visibility frontier can help us discover potential 
risk elements previously undisclosed. Secondly, none of the two suppliers (X- and Y) 
experiences increased risk from sharing the same sub-supplier, as they are independent 
and figurate in different channels within the supply chain. For the buyer on the other 
hand, the fact that the two suppliers share the same sub-supplier means that a single 
disruption negates the risk-reducing effects of their dual sourcing strategy. Since none 
of the suppliers have incentives to manage risk any differently, the hypothetical situation 
described here highlights the need for SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers by the focal 
company”. 
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Wei and Wang (2010) takes a dynamic capability view on SCV and examined how visibility 
can be utilized as a firm specific competence in order to increase a company’s ability to 
reconfigure. In their paper, four distinct forms of visibility were developed, each with its 
specific approach to drive supply chain re-configurability. “Visibility for sensing”, “visibility 
for learning”, “visibility for coordinating” and “visibility for integrating” (Wei and Wang 
2010).  
Regarding the first “Visibility for sensing” is explained as the ability of the company to access 
real-time information thereby recognizing changes in the environment. This especially entails 
changes in customer needs and market-information needs, and is proven to have a direct impact 
on strategic supply chain performance (Wei and Wang 2010).  
 
The second, “Visibility for learning” represents the ability of a company to learn, and attain 
information from other members of the supply chain, including its suppliers and buyers. 
External knowledge is fundamental for building capabilities, and  expanding the knowledge 
base by using the supply network can increase supply chain performance (Johnson, Sohi, and 
Grewal 2004).  
 
Third, “Visibility for coordinating” entails coordinating dependencies such as incoming goods 
and outgoing information-flows. This is achieved through the usage of e.g., modern Material 
Resource Planning (MRP)/Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, building buffer 
inventories or sharing relevant shipping information. Hence, visibility for coordination offers 
important decision support in supply chains (Sahin and Robinson 2002).  
 
Lastly, “Visibility for integration” entails creating consensus and common understanding of the 
supply chains goals, and is thought to increase in conjunction with the amount of information 
shared. It provides the understanding of each firm’s capabilities, strengths, goals, and skills and 
help achieving goal congruence in a supply chain (Jap 1999).  
 
In contradiction to the findings of Wei and Wang (2010), Brusset (2016)’s research on the 
relationship between visibility and agility suggests that visibility alone cannot enhance agility 
(we find it feasible to compare the two studies as responsiveness and re-configurability are key 
concepts of agility). It is however worth mentioning that Brusset (2016) only uses survey data, 
and only data from a single source within each business studied, and that the quality and depth 
of information may therefore be insufficient to provide strong evidence. 
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Moreover, the concept of visibility has also been studied in the context of power-dependence 
theory. Nguyen et al. (2017) finds that under high dependence of buyer on supplier, visibility 
is more required to mitigate risk. Vice versa, “the importance of visibility is reduced if buyer is 
not dependent on its supplier”- (Nguyen et al. 2017 p.69). The basic message and fundamental 
conclusion of their paper is that visibility is an important proactive approach in mitigating 
supplier risk for the buying firm, and that the firm must invest in integrating the suppliers IT-
resources in order for the benefit to be realized.  
 Collaborative- and contractual SCRM  
Collaborative approach 
One of the key underlying assumptions of SCM is that the participants in a supply chain are co-
dependent and that the overall performance of the chain therefore affects the individual 
members. Another is that optimizing “silos” or the individual results of each company creates 
a sub-optimal chain.  
 
If we view “opportunism” through the lens of SCM, it is possible to argue that opportunistic 
behavior is idiosyncratic because the self-interest of each company is aligned with the long-
term performance of the chain. Long-term could be a key word here as the expectation of a brief 
relationship might tempt supply chain participants to realize short-term profits from 
opportunistic behavior. Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne (2003) studied the effect of extendedness 
on opportunism resulting from specific assets in buyer-supplier dyads. Their findings suggest 
that for buyers who had sunk costs associated with a supplier, “a relationship's extendedness 
or future time horizon can also serve to mitigate the expropriation risk that specific investments 
produce”- (Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003)  
 
Developing a shared SCRM understanding is considered critical for the successful creation of 
a SCRM strategy (Chopra and Sodhi 2004). This can be achieved by “stress-testing”, which 
entails an approach of “what if” scenarios (contingency planning) and is helpful in creating 
shared ownership of the SCRM process (Chopra and Sodhi 2004). The term “shared SCRM 
understanding” might seem somewhat vague, but according to Hinds and Weisband (2003), 
shared SCRM understanding refers to the extents of cognitive overlap and commonality in 
beliefs, expectations, and perceptions about SCRM. Coleman (1990) finds that shared 
understanding tends to be more prominent in companies with repeated interactions.  
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Contractual SCRM  
By contractual SCRM, we refer to any contractual elements aimed towards/or resulting in 
managing or reducing risk. Supply chain contracts could offer robust strategies to increase 
supply chain resilience through mitigating uncertainties or risks in addition to making a supply 
chain more efficient (Tang 2006). Such risk sharing contracts  or “Risk Sharing Mechanisms” 
(RSM) have found extensive academic attention with publications such as Cachon and Lariviere 
(2005) and Jeong (2012) exploring their potential in mitigating risk associated with uncertain 
demand and price fluctuations (Ghadge et al. 2017). Under these circumstances (uncertain 
demand, fluctuating price,) Ghadge et al. (2017) finds that buyers and sellers can reduce SCR 
by calculating and agreeing to an optimal order quantity and price. Fixing the price reduces risk 
for the buyer, while a set quantity reduces the risk of the seller. 
   
RSM are not always “result-oriented” but can also refer to efforts aimed at aligning incentives 
and assigning responsibility among supply chain members (Jüttner 2005). Shared SCRM 
amongst participating supply chain members enhances the effectiveness of risk sharing 
mechanisms (Li et al. 2015). One such risk sharing mechanism is the use of target cost contracts 
where the buyer and supplier contractually agree on the expected cost of a project. 
Consequently, the two entities share the variance between budgeted costs and real costs whether 
it is higher or lower than budgeted. This aligns incentives to keep costs as low as possible. In 
terms of risk, such an arrangement also reduces the budget risk, potentially facilitating better 
financial asset utilization (Li et al. 2015).  
 
There are other contractual elements beside contract-type that can influence SCR beyond tier-
one suppliers. One of these involves the buying organization requiring adherence to their CoC 
from their immediate supplier, and of any sub-supplier involved in the supply chain (Vytopil 
2015). Such a CoC can include a number of different demands, from environmental standards, 
requirement regarding working conditions, safety- and security measures as well as guidelines 
for documentation of adherence (Vytopil 2015). Industry standards (such as ISO) can be used 
with similar effect. 
Even without a CoC or industry standard, contract clauses can influence risk and risk 
management practices. Examples of this can be:  
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Restrictions on sub-supplier location 
Preventing the supplier from using sub-suppliers from a country with high environmental 
uncertainty connected to regulation or an area where the risk of disruption from e.g. natural 
disasters is considered to be high.  
 
Maximum lead-time 
Establish a maximum lead-time limit between supplier and sub-supplier in order to reduce the 
time of replenishment in case of quality deficiencies or a lost shipment of goods.  
 
Minimum stock level  
Setting a minimum stock level requirement so that production stops or belated deliveries does 
not transfer throughout the chain. 
 
Financial solidity and liquidity  
Requiring a minimum level of financial solidity and liquidity for sub-suppliers to prevent 
business discontinuity from affecting supply chain operations. 
 
The abovementioned examples does not represent an exhaustive list, but it indicates that 
including such clauses in contracts with the immediate supplier allows the buyer to influence 
sourcing strategies beyond the first-tier, thereby shaping the supply chain in a favorable manner, 
and affecting the probability and consequences of various risk elements (Vytopil 2015). 
 
 Information sharing 
Risk information sharing refers to situations where companies in a supply chain share critical 
SCR information to the other members in the chain. Successful information sharing can 
improve the coordination of different processes in a supply chain, and thus improve the overall 
integration, delivery accuracy, reduce the time to market, as well as increasing the customer 
satisfaction and the quality of the supply chain collaboration (Li et al. 2015). 
 
The concepts of information sharing and visibility are logically interrelated because increased 
information sharing by definition increases visibility between the entities in question. 
Following this logic, information sharing can be considered a means to an end (visibility). 
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 On the other hand, a basic level of visibility is required for information exchange to take place, 
as entities in the supply chain cannot share information with each other without knowledge of 
party’s existence. This may be an unlikely occurrence in traditional buyer-supplier dyads, 
however becomes a possibility when we examine relationships extending several echelons of 
the supply chain.   
 
There are interesting insights to be found in the intersection between information sharing and 
power dependence theory. For example,  Xiao, Xie and Hu (2013) found that the dominant 
party in terms of relative power dictates information sharing in buyer-supplier dyads. Therefore, 
we can say that the supply-chains influence on the information exchange is determined by 
whether or not there exist a dominant force. If this statement is true, then different echelons of 
the supply network that are relatively equal in relative power, will find that collaboration might 
be the only option for achieving information exchange. These two scenarios (dominated or 
equal dyads) results in different information flows within the network, with information flowing 
both ways with the collaborative approach, and towards the dominating party in the other. This 
scenario is depicted in Figure 4, below.  
 
 
Figure 4: Information exchange under two different supply chain Power structures. (Own production) 
 
It stands to reason that not all supply chains will be organized like the two examples visualized 
in Figure 3. For example, supply-chain-wide visibility of vulnerabilities requires information 
sharing across supply chain participants (Kleindorfer and Saad 2005). Thus, despite significant 
power difference between participating parties, the information-flow may still be 
bilateral/multilateral.  
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We should also be careful to assume that a bilateral collaboratory approach to information 
sharing is necessarily superior to a dominant one-sided one, since “Unilateral inter-firm IT 
governance form can be stable and long lasting regardless of the power distribution between 
the two parties, as long as stable inter-firm governance exists”- (Xiao, Xie, and Hu 2013b.page 
526) 
 
Within SCRM, information sharing has two distinct roles. Proactivity through elucidating risk 
elements in the supply chain, enhancing visibility and thereby allowing supply chain 
participants to take an active approach to managing risk. Reactively, information sharing acts 
as an early-warning mechanism in the case of emergent risk elements, facilitating detection and 
the spreading of vital information to all relevant parties in the supply chain. When companies 
are informed about a contingency before the event occurs, or in the early stages of development, 
contingency-plans may be put into effect. 
 
Parajuli, Kuzgunkaya, and Vidyarthi (2017) find that “combining proactive and reactive 
strategies improve supply chain responsiveness to disaster events, and are effective in 
minimizing both short term impacts and long term losses of market shares from major 
disruptions”- (Parajuli, Kuzgunkaya, and Vidyarthi 2017. p13-14). 
 
In addition to acting as an early warning mechanism, reactive information sharing can also 
increase the speed and effectiveness of the supply chains responsiveness, agility and other risk 
mitigating efforts (Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Tse and Tan 2012;  Moberg et al. 2002).  
 Transaction cost theory  
Transaction Cost Theory (TCT), also known as Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is a 
discipline coined by Williamson (1971). According to TCT, transaction costs exists due to two 
underlying assumptions, opportunism, and bounded rationality. Opportunism, defined as “self-
interest seeking with guile”- (Williamson 1985) refers to that “homo economicus” will act in a 
way that benefits itself, even if these actions negatively impact its supply chain partners. 
Bounded rationality within this context refers to the limited ability of contracts to foresee and 
predict every possible outcome of a scenario. This is an adaptation of Simon's (1961) original 
definition which states that “human behavior is intendedly rational, but limitedly so”- (Simon 
1961 p.24). 
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The mode of analysis within TCT is Transaction Cost Analysis (Buvik 2002a), which uses the 
transaction between sellers- and buyers as the unit of analysis (Riordan and Williamson 1985; 
O. E. Williamson 1981; O. E. Williamson 1991).  
 
There are two categories of transaction costs (Buvik 2002b). Ex-ante transaction costs, which 
constitute opportunity costs (Masten, Meehan, and Snyder 1991), and results from incorrect use 
of specific assets (Rindfleisch, Heide, and Walker 1997). 
The second category, ex-post transaction costs relate to problems of hidden actions in ongoing 
relationships (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992). 
Buvik (2002a) presents four types of ex-post transaction costs: 
 
“1. Performance control (e.g. the verification of production costs). 2. Performance verification 
costs (e.g. product quality assessment). 3. Adjustment costs (e.g. change orders difficulties). 4. 
Bargaining costs (e.g. price negotiations).”- (Buvik 2002a. p.568). 
 
Although Williamson recognizes both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs, little of the 
empirical and analytical TCT literature focus on how ex-ante supplier screening can reduce ex-
post opportunism (Stephen and Gillanders 1993), and thereby the need for monitoring and 
control. The one-sided “ex-post” focus is problematic if we consider the possibility of a 
substitutive relationship between supplier screening- and monitoring.  
 
In the early stages of the discipline’s development, TCT was criticized for not considering the 
role of differential capabilities in structuring economic organizations (Richardson 1972); 
neglecting power relations (Perrow 1986), and trust and social embeddedness (Granoveter 
1985). In this regard, it is relevant to point out that Williamson (2010) only consider TCT to be 
one of the lenses through which to study complex economical organizations, meaning that it is 
not intended to be all-encompassing, but rather complementary to other modes of research. The 
complementarity of TCT and “the capabilities view” becomes evident when reviewing the work 
of El Meladi, Glavee-Geo, and Buvik (2018). Their article on “Understanding how opportunism 
and resource capability affect performance in exporter-LSP outsourcing relationships”, finds 
amongst other things, that while opportunism has a negative effect on outsourcing performance, 
an increase in perceived opportunism increases the effect of flexibility on performance (El 
Meladi, Glavee-Geo, and Buvik 2018). 
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Over the years, the external critique of TCT has largely subsided, probably due to its fruitful 
usage in academia and further cemented through the Nobel Prizes awarded Ronald H. Coase 
(1991) and Oliver E. Williamson (2009) for their work within the field.  
    
Of the remaining critics in the post-80s era, Moran and Ghoshal's (1996)  work is one of the 
harshest and most cited (Ketokivi and Mahoney 2017). Their critique includes objections to the 
notion that hierarchical control reduces opportunistic behavior, because monitoring and control 
in itself is detrimental to the relationship between the monitor and the monitored party, and 
thereby perpetuates opportunism. Williamson (1996) and Ketokivi and Mahoney (2017) 
responds to this criticism by highlighting that Moran and Ghoshal (1996) have a different 
conceptual understanding of opportunism than that found in the general TCT literature and that 
carefully executed control measures are unlikely to warrant a negative reception from the 
monitored party. 
 
Since its inception, TCT has developed to include issues other than those originally stated by 
Williamson. For instance, the examination of a wider range of hybrid governance mechanisms 
has led to more attention being payed to characteristics of specific agents and to incentives that 
help build trust and commitment (Heide and John 1992). This again have led to a new wave of 
criticism, as some academics believe TCT is only valid for the examination of individual 
business transactions, and that results garnered from utilizing the framework to study 
“relationship costs”, sustained governance partnerships and the complexities of supply chain 
cooperation are therefore flawed (Hammervoll 2009). Hammervoll’s critique is specifically 
targeting the Governance Value Analysis (GVA) model in terms of value creation; however, 
GVA is an extension of TCA.  
 
 
As previously stated, the unit of analysis in TCT is the transaction between a buyer and a seller. 
Since there are no direct transactions between a buyer and its sub-suppliers, the use of TCT to 
analyze SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers may not be entirely conventional. However, there are 
aspects of TCT in buyer-supplier relationships, which can potentially act as determinants of 
how SCR can be managed in the lower-tiers of the supply chain. Examples of this includes 
environmental uncertainty, where an increased level propagates more visibility and control 
measures. And specific assets, which influences opportunism, and thereby the possibility of 
suppliers acting in a way which negatively influences the buyer. 
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 Where there is more room for opportunism in the relationship, the buyer has increased 
incentives for active participation and the exertion of control in the risk management work.  
 
 Dependency 
Power-dependence is a social exchange theory originally developed by Richard M. Emerson 
between 1962 and 1972. It revolves around the relative power in exchange relationships, and 
the dependencies that arise from this, with the power A has over B equaling the dependency of 
B on A (Molm 2007).  
Power is defined by Emerson (1962) as “The power of actor A over actor B is the amount of 
resistance on the part of B which can be potentially overcome by A”- (Emerson 1962 p.32). 
Dependence is defined as: “The dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) directly proportional 
to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportional to the 
availability of those goals to A outside of the A-B relation.” (Emerson 1962 p. 32).  
 
Power dependence theory devise four different power-dependence scenarios 
 
Figure 5: Power Dependence Matrix (own production) 
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The different scenarios are further differentiated into two groups “Balanced”, consisting of  
“Balanced Low” and “Balanced High” and  “Unbalanced” made up by Power Advantage A” 
and ”Power Disadvantage A”.  
 
Unbalanced power relations are considered to be unstable because it encourages the use of 
power by “A”, which set in motion one of two responses from “B”, adaptation (cost reduction) 
or balancing operations (Emerson 1962). Adaptation entails that the disadvantaged actor adapts 
to the demands of the advantaged actor. This adaptation comes with a “cost” which can be either 
economical, emotional or entail a shift in values. It does not however, change the nature of the 
relationship, and the actor with less relative power would still be susceptible to future demands. 
The second option of “balancing operations” on the other hand involves attempts to restore 
power-balance to the relationship by either reducing B’s dependence on A, or increasing A’s 
dependence on B.  Emerson (1962) define four such balancing operation strategies:  
Motivational withdrawal  
Redirection of resources and motivation towards other activities.  
Extension of power network 
Establishing new partnerships that allow the disadvantaged actor the opportunity to circumvent 
the advantaged actor. In a business setting, this strategy could equate to a buyer establishing a 
relationship with a second supplier of his product.  
Coalition formation 
Cooperation amongst two or more disadvantaged actors with the intention of increasing their 
relative power in comparison with an advantaged actor. An example of this could be that several 
independent farmers form a collective in order to consolidate their production-volumes and 
negotiate higher prices with industrial buyers.   
Emergence of status 
The disadvantaged actor seeks to increase the advantaged actor’s motivational investment in 
the relationship and thereby increasing its dependence by affording it some special acclaim or 
prestige. This is quite vague, and finding practical examples is a challenge, however it could 
include favorable mentions of the advantaged actor in the media. Generally, “Emergence of 
status” as a balancing operation tends to involve providing something that is highly valued by 
the receiver, while of low cost to the sender (Emerson 1962).          
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In relation to SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers, the relevance of power-dependency theory is 
that relative power and dependencies between a buyer and its immediate supplier may affect 
the buyers’ ability to influence the supply chain. Pedersen and Andersen (2006) finds that 
holding a weak bargaining position will make it difficult for buyers to assert influence over 
suppliers. Along the same lines, power-asymmetry is a requirement for compliance (Locke, 
Amengual, and Mangla 2015). Viewing the problem of SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers from 
a buyer-perspective, this suggests that the “Power Advantage A” scenario in Figure 5: Power 
Dependence Matrix (own production) is the only one where the buyer can influence the 
supplier. Even if this is the case, we are still talking about a dyadic buyer supplier relationship. 
But, what about the buyers’ influence on subsequent tiers? Preuss (2001) argues that if a buyer 
requires the use of a “standard”, not only the immediate supplier will have to follow it, but also 
the lower-tiers of suppliers involved in the production of the buyers product. Hoejmose et al. 
(2013) calls this effect a “multiplier-effect” and suggest that it may be strongest in power-
asymmetries favoring the buyer.  
 
A natural extension to the theory and background of dependence relations in organizational 
research is the inherent role of resources as determinants of dependency, which also is the 
domain of Resource Dependence Theory (RDT). 
       
A fundamental thesis in RDT is that there is a connection between the organizational actions 
and its environment. This is due to the suggestion that organizations are not able to acquire all 
resources or functions internally to sustain themselves, and organizations are dependent on 
other organizations in the environment, thus relationships and transactions occur between 
organizations (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976). RDT stresses the importance of power, and from an 
RDT perspective the power organization “A” has over organization “B” stems from the degree 
of dependence organization “B” has towards organization “A” (Davis and Cobb 2010). It is 
worth to mention that since power between two organizations is not a zero-sum game, both 
organization “A” and “B” can be dependent on each other, making them interdependent. As 
such, to determine the level of dependence an organization must define what resources are 
critical for its operations. RDT emphasize the cost or the total amount of resources acquired is 
not the first priority, instead, if the organization are unable to continue functioning without a 
specific resource it is critical (Nienhüser 2008). 
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RDT further arguments that uncertainty, in itself, is not problematic, however when dependency 
is present for the critical resources, the organization have to implement measures to reduce 
uncertainty. This is similar to what is stated in TCT, where Williamson (1985) argued that high 
uncertainty and dependency cause problems related to specific resources i.e., transaction costs. 
RDT presents some alternatives to reduce dependency, since it is assumed that all organizations 
seek to reduce their dependence to others and increase their own power. However, when 
measuring dependency, one must consider the perception of the individuals. The individuals 
are responsible for evaluating pricing the resources, and the nature of bounded rationality makes 
this difficult (Nienhüser 2008). Consequently, if an organization overestimates the resources 
they acquire, or underestimates their own resources, then there is a perceived dependence 
towards others, which ultimately can create a skewed view towards the power other of 
organizations (Nienhüser 2008). 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) proposed different strategies organizations could use to reduce the 
external dependencies on others. Examples are; Mergers/Vertical integration, Joint ventures 
and other inter-organizational relationships However, Pfeffer (1976) states that each of these 
strategies have limitations when it comes to their effect(s), due to the fact that organizations are 
constructed as open systems. For example, after a merger is completed, the company has 
successfully managed a dependence, but most likely they have created dependency towards 
another organization at the same time (Pfeffer 1976).  
 
According to Pfeffer (1976) there are three reasons to why organizations might merge: “ First, 
to reduce competition by absorbing an important competitior (sic) organizations; second to 
manage interdependencies with either sources of input or purchasers of output by absorbing 
them; and third, to diversify operations and thereby lessen dependence on present 
organizations with which it exchanges”- (J. Pfeffer 1976 p.39).  
 
Other inter-organizational relationships like Joint ventures (JV), Research and development 
(R&D) deals, strategic alliances etc. have been subject to research from an RDT perspective, 
and along with TCT it is one of the most common way to explain resource dependency 
(Hillman, Withers, and Collins 2009). The RDT research on inter-organizational relationships 
focus on how organizations manage dependencies and uncertainties, but unlike mergers, they 
do not absorb all of the dependency. Empirical evidence shows that JVs are most likely to occur 
between interdependent organizations. 
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Further, it shows that inter-organizational relationships reduce both domestic and international 
environmental complexity and uncertainty, while allowing organizations to acquire resources 
(Hillman, Withers, and Collins 2009). The claims RDT makes on inter-organizational are 
largely supported by empirical evidence, however, scholars continue to rely on other theoretical 
perspectives to give a more holistic perspective on JVs and other inter-organizational 
relationships (Hillman, Withers, and Collins 2009).  
 
 
 Relational Exchange Theory 
Relational Exchange Theory (RET), also known as Relational Exchange, relational marketing 
or B2B Relational Exchange, is a subtype within Social Exchange Theory (SET), which 
specifically examines dyadic business-to-business relationships. As a modern discipline, SET 
was developed in the 1950s and 60s with substantial contributions being made by Homans 
(1958), Blau (1964;1960;1955), Emerson (1962) and Thibault and Kelley (1959). However, its 
roots can be traced all the way back to Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics” (Lambe, Wittmann, 
and Spekman 2008). The fundamental assumption of SET is that entities choose to enter into 
relationships because they expect positive returns in excess of what they could expect without 
the relationship (Homans 1958). Although the actors in RET are organizations instead of 
individuals (as in SET), Homans' (1958) assumption about relationships still apply; 
Organization enter into relationships because they expect the returns to be higher than what 
they will be if they do not (Homans 1958). 
 
In the context of a business, however, this statement does not tell us much, as any business is 
entirely dependent on having a relationship for any exchange to take place. Without the 
exchange of goods or services, there will be no transactions, and by consequence, in time no 
businesses. Because of this, RET examines more fruitful questions, namely the determinants of 
why companies chose to enter into one relationship instead of another, and the appropriate level 
of integration in the eventual relationship.       
 
In order to answer such questions, Lambe, Wittmann, and Spekman (2008) defines six relevant 
variables from the SET literature, which are used when examining B2B exchanges, dependence, 
trust, commitment, cooperation, relational norms and satisfaction (Lambe, Wittmann, and 
Spekman 2008).  
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Although all these aspects are useful, and to an extensive degree overlapping and mutually 
influential, Smith and Barclay (1997) find “trust” to be most influential in determining effective 
business relationships. 
 
Trust can be defined as “The belief in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity”-(Morgan 
and Hunt 1994 p.23). Or “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on an expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party”- (Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman 1995 p.712). We consider these definitions interchangeable, and similar enough 
that the use of one over the other will not significantly influence the data or analysis in the 
various works.  
 
Although there appears to be accord in the literature on the definition of trust in all but 
semantics, the concept can be operationalized and used in several different ways. Araujo and 
Franco (2017) used a qualitative case study approach to find the determinants of trust in a 
coopetion relationship. Their findings include the discovery of five distinct “trust building 
mechanisms”, namely: Mutual dependence, previous experience and reputation, awareness of 
the risk of opportunistic behavior, contractual agreements and dynamic processes (Araujo and 
Franco 2017). Worth mentioning however, is that their study does not examine a buyer-supplier 
relationship, but rather a coopetition-relationship between two competing suppliers. That said, 
the results can still be viable for dyadic buyer-supplier relationships as the optimal state of such 
a relationship is coopetition, balancing competition and cooperation (Eriksson 2016).  
 
Ha, Park, and Cho (2011) discern two distinct types of trust. “Affective trust”, which results 
from openness, positive mutual understanding, honesty and respect, and “Trust in competency”, 
which comes from business capabilities, satisfaction with know-how, willingness to accept 
partners specialty and unique knowledge/skills (Ha, Park, and Cho 2011). Their findings 
suggest that both affective trust and trust in competency have positive effects on benefit/risk-
sharing efforts, while only affective trust has a positive influence on information sharing (Ha, 
Park, and Cho 2011).  
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In the context of SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers, trust is an important aspect, as the degree 
of trust a buyer has in its first-tier supplier could potentially determine whether it sees it as 
necessary to manage lower-tier supplier themselves, or if the job of doing so can be left to the 
supplier. In such situations, affective trust would refer to the belief that the supplier would act 
directly or indirectly in the interest of the buying party and conduct their SCRM effort with 
good intentions. Trust in competency would refer to whether the buyer believes that the supplier 
has adequate knowledge, know-how and financial resources to conduct such efforts effectively.  
 
Based on the available literature there is mixed or inconclusive findings when it comes to the 
relationship between trust and control (Teng and Das 2013). Lambe, Wittmann, and Spekman 
(2008) finds that there is lack of empirical findings to support the notion that relational norms, 
trust and other forms of informal governance can replace formal governance. Informal 
governance is required because bounded rationality hinders contracts from being able to 
encompass all eventualities in a relational exchange (Bernheim and Whinston 1998). Teng and 
Das (2013), who researched the effects of trust and control in creating confidence in partner 
cooperation finds that the two can be both substitutive and complementary.  
 
Substitutive in that a high level of trust negates the need for complex contracts, and a well-
defined contract reduces the need to rely on trust. Complementary, in that the both contribute 
towards creating confidence. They also dispute the idea that confidence is constant, and that an 
increase in either trust or control must necessarily result in a decrease in the other factor. In 
contrast, companies should pursue both trust building –and control initiatives to achieve 
increased confidence in buyer-supplier partnerships (Teng and Das 2013). 
 
Over time, successful exchange leads to a buildup of trust (Gottfridsson, Rundh, and Camen 
2011). We can therefore say that the level of trust in an exchange relationship is not constant. 
Because of this, measures of control should also differ over time. In the early stages of trust 
development, transactional contracts provide added control due to their comprehensiveness. 
When trust is developed, relational contracts that sacrifice control for flexibility may be more 
applicable (McNeil 1978; Gottfridsson, Rundh, and Camen 2011).  
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter provides a walkthrough of the methodological choices made at all stages of the 
research. A methodology is the overarching, systematic analysis of methods and principles 
within a field, thus acting as an umbrella under which all other questions regarding methods 
and structure of the research are positioned (Schensul 2008). The methodology differs from 
what we refer to as “methods” in that it is not a tool meant for developing data or information, 
but rather an overview of the methods and techniques used (Schensul 2008) 
To acquire the best results in research it is therefore crucial to have an explicit, systematic and 
planned approach (Mohajan 2018).  
 
The chapter begins by presenting the philosophical position of the study, followed by a 
presentation of research approach, design, strategy, case selection, case descriptions, research 
setting, data collection, data analysis and validity and reliability. 
Figure 6 below summarizes all the key methodological choices made for the study. 
 
Figure 6: The research onion. Adapted from (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009) 
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3.2 Philosophical position 
There are different epistemological and ontological stances researchers can take during 
research. The different epistemological and ontological stances are closely tied to the research 
design and methods used in the study and affects how researchers uncovers knowledge in social 
science (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009). Ontology concerns the nature of the social 
phenomena being investigated, and whether social entities are considered objective entities or 
social constructs (Bryman 2012). Ontology also questions the social reality and individual 
consciousness; is reality objective? Is it perhaps a result of the individual cognition? The two 
ontological positions, objectivism and constructionism, are divided by the questions of 
“whether social entities can and should be considered objective entities that have a reality 
external to social actors, or whether they can and should be considered social constructions 
built up from the perceptions and actions of social actors” (Bryman 2012 p.32). 
 
In our research, we have taken a constructionist position. Hence, we support the latter statement 
that social entities should be considered social constructs built from the perceptions and actions 
of social actors.  
 
With a constructivism positioning the “social phenomena and their meaning are continually 
being accomplished by social actors. It implies that social phenomena and categories are not 
only produced through social interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision” 
(Bryman 2012 p.33). This also means that the reality we present are not regarded as definitive, 
but a specific version of social reality.  
 
According to Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2007) epistemology is the assumptions 
researchers make about “ the very bases of knowledge- its nature and form, how it can be 
acquired, and how (sic.) communicated to other human beings” (Cohen, Manion, and Morrison 
2007 p.7). An epistemological issue we must consider is whether “the social world can and 
should be studied according to the same principles, procedures and ethos as the natural 
sciences” (Bryman 2012 p.27). When it comes to epistemology, we have taken an interpretive 
stance, meaning that we “understand, explain and demystify social reality through the eyes of 
different participants; the participants themselves define the social reality” (Cohen, Manion, 
and Morrison 2007 p.19). In the context of this research, we see “knowledge” as being 
subjective and personal and thereby rejecting the approach of natural scientists.  
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3.3 Research approach 
There are different ways to look at the relationship between theory and empirical research. The 
most common view is the deductive approach, where theory guides the collection and analysis 
of data, and the research questions are influenced by theoretical considerations (Bryman 2012). 
Another approach is the inductive reasoning, with this view the theory emerges after the 
collection and analysis of the gathered data. The chosen research approach is linked to our 
philosophical position as described in Chapter 3.2. Applying an inductive reasoning in our 
research fits well with the philosophical position of interpretivism. With an inductive approach, 
you are able to produce new theory as the outcome of your research (Bryman 2012). The 
inductive stance allows us to draw generalizable inferences based on the conducted interviews 
and the document analysis. The premise for inductive reasoning is that with a certain amount 
of data, the researchers may discover relationships and findings (Cohen, Manion, and Morrison 
2007) 
 
 
In the beginning of the 20th century, social scientists argued that to be able to make a cause-
effect link between variables, you have to understand how your research objects interpret the 
social world (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009). One of the strengths for inductive approach 
is that it allows for such an understanding. In addition to this, the inductive approach usually 
places interested in the context of the research objectives, therefore we can allow ourselves to 
study a smaller sample (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009). 
 
 
3.4 Research design 
There are several different definitions of research design. Given (2008) defines it as “the logic 
that links the data to be collected to the initial questions that were asked”- (Given 2008 p.931). 
Creswell (2014) on the other hand refers to research designs as “types of inquiry within 
qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches that provide specific direction for 
procedures in a research design”-(Creswell 2014 p.41). What Creswell labels as research 
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design mirrors what we refer to as “research strategy” and we therefore prefer Given’s (2008) 
definition.  
Yin (2003) outlines three different research designs for case studies. Exploratory, as a 
prerequisite to other research, hypotheses and questions. Descriptive, to account narratives, and 
explanatory, which is aimed at testing hypotheses.  
 
We have conducted exploratory research, and as the name implies, the intentions are mainly to 
further explore the research questions chosen. An exploratory approach does not provide 
conclusions to the problem studied; rather it provides guidance to future research on the topic, 
thereby coinciding with our research objective. The three main ways of conducting exploratory 
research is by interviewing “experts” in the subject, searching through the literature or 
performing focus group interviews (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009). For this research, 
we have interviewed “experts” in the subject, and searched through literature. 
 
 
3.5 Research Strategy 
There are several different research strategies researchers can utilize during research, examples 
include survey, grounded theory, case study, ethnography and experiment (Saunders, Lewis, 
and Thornhill 2009). None of the strategies are inferior or superior to one another. While, some 
are more suited for the inductive approach, others have a better fit for the deductive approach 
(Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009).  
 
When choosing the strategy most suited for our research, the most important aspect was whether 
is enables us to answer the research questions and meet our objectives. Due to the characteristics 
of our study, our ontological and epistemological stance, and the developed research 
questions, the most suited approach to complete this thesis was by utilizing a case study as our 
research method. Our case study is a collective case study that builds on the instrumental case 
study. Meaning that to give insight into an issue or refine a theory, a particular case is studied, 
but in our thesis, multiple companies are involved. A collective case study can rely on different 
sources of data and multiple different collection methods, such as observations, interviews, 
narrative reports, questionnaires and numerical data (Punch 2005). According to Punch (2005) 
“The case study aims to understand the case in depth, and in its natural setting, recognizing its 
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complexity and its context. It also has a holistic focus, aiming to preserve and understand the 
wholeness and unity of the case”- (Punch 2005 p.144). 
 
Using case studies as a research design is suitable when the aim of the research is to find 
answers to “why” and “how” questions, when behavioral events are beyond 
the researchers control, and when studying contemporary events (Teegavarapu and Summers 
2008). As all three elements are true for this research, we find that a case study approach is 
applicable.  Further substantiating the choice of case study as research design for studying 
SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers is that little, or no theory exist, which adequately describes 
the phenomenon, and as stated by Eisenhardt (1989), “one strength of building theory from 
cases is the likelihood of generating novel theory”- (Eisenhardt 1989 p.546). Furthermore, the 
theory generated closely mirrors reality due to the researchers’ intimate interaction with 
evidence (Eisenhardt 1989). Choosing a multiple case approach also negates a common 
weakness of single case studies that the researcher becomes unable to distinguish between 
important relationships and idiosyncrasies of the specific case by gathering evidence across 
cases (Eisenhardt 1989).  
3.6 Case selection 
We define case selection as the methods used to choose which and how many cases/businesses 
to select as research objects.  
 
Figure 7: Methodological choices in case selection. (Own production) 
A depiction of methodological decisions regarding the selection of cases in case studies. The decisions made in this research 
are colored green.  
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There are two main “families” of sampling logic, “random sampling” and “purposive 
sampling”. Random sampling entails choosing cases randomly selection within the population, 
and is based on the idea that randomness hinder bias in the selection process. In case study 
research, random sampling is a viable strategy when examining a few variables in a large 
number of cases. With purposive sampling, the researcher actively chooses which cases which 
cases should be selected from the population. There are several strategies for doing so which is 
further explained later in this chapter.  
 
Seawright and Gerring (2008) finds that comparable case studies composed of a relatively low 
number of cases, randomized sampling produces results that are unrepresentative of the 
population.  
Since our exploratory approach necessitates in depth analysis of each case, the number of cases 
are logically low. This makes the case for our choice of using purposive sampling in our case 
selection.  
 
One important question to address is how many cases are needed to achieve the desired level 
of generalizability (Ellram 1996). For each case utilized in the research, there is a correlating 
increase in replications, which influences the generalizability of the results. Furthermore, a 
larger number of cases can also increase the proportion of companies within the total population 
that share relevant similarities to the selected cases. We can therefore claim that that it is 
favorable to have as many cases as possible, as long as it does not affect the “depth” of each 
case. In reality however, researcher rarely have unlimited time and resources. These capacity 
constraints thereby dictate the maximum number of cases that are available for selection. Due 
to the complexity of the thesis subject, a larger number of replications is required for external 
validity. When balancing this view with the practical restrictions on time and resources we find 
that six cases will be sufficient to present a holistic view of SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers. 
This is generally considered enough to generate compelling evidence for either rejecting or 
confirming initial propositions (Ellram 1996).  
 
There are two main replication logics within purposive sampling; Theoretical replication, which 
relates the same issue being investigated in several cases the researcher expect will provide 
contrasting results, for predictable reasons (Yin 2003), and “literal replication”, where one issue 
is investigated in several cases which are expected to produce similar results. Both replication 
logics can generate generalizability, but in contrasting manners. Theoretical replications 
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generate results that are generalizable to cases with similar characteristics as those used in the 
research, while literal replication creates results that are generalizable to the category of the 
population the selected cases belong to.  
 
Because we aimed to provide a broad conceptual understanding of SCRM beyond first-tier 
suppliers and generate theoretical generalization, we chose to select cases that differed from 
each other when evaluated in accordance with one or more of our theoretical perspectives (SET, 
TCT and Dependence). This constitutes a theoretical replication logic.  
 
3.7 Case Descriptions 
In this section, we describe the six cases selected for this research. The names of all companies 
have been changed in order for the companies and informants to remain anonymous. Table 2: 
Case overview provides an overview of the cases, while descriptions that are more detailed 
follow below. 
Table 2: Case overview 
Case Industry Product type Risk focus Key informant 
Shipbuilder Shipbuilding Physical 
Delivery-time 
and capacity 
Managing 
Director 
Scandi-TV TV-distribution 
Electrical 
components 
CSR Purchaser 
Foodpro Retail 
Agricultural 
Produce 
CSR and 
disruption 
Purchaser 
HeavyMetal Offshore Petroleum 
Processed 
metal 
Delivery-time 
Managing 
Director 
Propmaker Shipbuilding 
Metals and 
miscellaneous 
Delivery-time 
and quality 
Director of 
purchasing 
Call AS Telecommunications 
Software and 
electrical 
hardware 
Business 
continuity and 
supplier 
consolidation 
Department 
Manager 
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Shipbuilder 
Shipbuilder is the local branch of a global enterprise operating in the shipbuilding industry. The 
product supplied by Shipbuilder to its customers are physical parts with relatively low criticality 
that are sourced from suppliers in both Europe and Asia. In addition to the products purchased 
from other companies, Shipbuilder also has some internal production, amounting to 
approximately 10% of total sales.  
 
When procuring products, the company collects quotations from at least three suppliers. 
Generally, the same suppliers are involved in most auction processes and Shipbuilder knows 
these companies well.  
Due to the relationship between Shipbuilder and these suppliers, there is a high degree of trust 
towards the suppliers, and the company has therefore decided not to conduct any monitoring or 
SCRM activity in the lower levels of the supply chain.  
 
The main risk Shipbuilder experiences in its operations is capacity problems, meaning that 
suppliers do not have the necessary production capacity to fulfill the company’s orders within 
an acceptable time frame. In order to mitigate this risk, Shipbuilder believes that it requires 
longer-and closer supplier relationships. To accomplish this, the company is moving away from 
running bidding processes for each project and look to establish long-term framework 
agreements with key suppliers. 
  
  
Scandi-TV 
Scandi-TV is a large Scandinavian TV-distribution company who procure a large variety of 
electrical components. Due to the nature of the products purchased, their supply network is 
extensive and lower tier suppliers’ number in the thousands. Not only are there many sub-
suppliers, but these are also very spread out geographically. 
 
The job of Scandi-TV’s first-tier suppliers is primarily to assemble the electrical components 
in to a final product for consumer and business markets. Scandi-TV has a close working 
relationship with its first-tier suppliers and often visit the supplier to observe the assembly.  
The company has the opportunity to run audits on lower-tier suppliers and focuses on doing so. 
However, since the number of sub-suppliers is so high, they cannot monitor or audit all of them. 
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When on audits, the company’s risk-focus is on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and 
social risk.   
 
 
Foodpro 
Foodpro is a food producer and brand-owner who supplies both HoReCa (Hotels Restaurants 
and Catering) and grocery stores with produce. The company’s first-tier suppliers are large 
wholesalers located in Europe, while the bottom-tier suppliers (mainly farms) are spread out 
geographically according to the growth areas for their products. Foodpro place high value on 
SCV, and have mapped their entire supply chain. The first-tier supplier, who also actively 
conducts SCRM-efforts, provides information about lower-tier suppliers to Foodpro.  
This information is believed to be trustworthy, as the two company agree on the importance of 
SCRM and have common goals.  
 
Like Scandi-TV, Foodpro also have a large supplier network with a high number of sub-
suppliers, and cannot actively monitor and audit them all. Based on the information on sub-
suppliers gathered by tier-one as well as knowledge about the external environment they operate 
in, the company is able to create a compound risk-score (CRS) for each sub-supplier which 
helps determine whether additional measures are necessary to lower risk.  
 
For Foodpro, the two main forms of SCR is CSR in the form of child labor, forced labor and 
unacceptable working conditions, and the risk of disruptions due to natural catastrophes or 
unfavorable climactic conditions. For the former, Foodpro relies on audits by either the first-
tier supplier or third parties to uncover the problems for then to offer assistance in rectifying 
them. In order to mitigate the impact of disruptions, the company tries to incorporate a dual- or 
multiple sourcing strategy with suppliers operating in different external environments. This is 
however not always possible as the production of some forms of produce is restricted to a 
specific geographic area.  
 
HeavyMetal 
HeavyMetal is a fabrication and machining company supplying the oil-industry with highly 
specialized custom products. The company’s primary product has a short supply chain with 
only two-tiers of suppliers. Due to high quality requirements, few companies qualify as 
suppliers, and HeavyMetal therefore operates in an environment where there is a supply-side 
40 
 
duopoly. Out of the two possible tier-one suppliers, the company distinctly prefer one to the 
other, as they deliver considerably better reliability and customer service. Reliability (the ability 
to deliver on time) is very important for HeavyMetal, as the cost of late deliveries to its 
customers is high. If the first-tier supplier does not deliver on time however, HeavyMetal does 
not receive any monetary compensation from them. Due to the market situation, the first-tier 
suppliers have a dominating position in the relationship with HeavyMetal. Because of this, the 
company cannot “require” the supplier to take actions to increase their reliability in any aspect, 
nor to disclose information about the lower levels of the supply chain. To mitigate the risk of 
late-deliveries they therefore include extensive time-buffers in their project planning.  
 
In addition to the primary product, HeavyMetal also purchases custom electric components. 
The end customer decides the specifications- and suppliers of these components, and 
HeavyMetal is therefore not responsible for any of the risk related to these products. 
 
The power-dependence situation makes it impossible for HeavyMetal to actively manage SCR, 
conduct monitoring of sub-suppliers and create visibility in the supply chain. Even in a reversed 
power-dependence scenario, HeavyMetal would not conduct monitoring activity because it 
believes that monitoring deteriorates trust in the relationships, hindering the exchange of tacit-
knowledge and increase bureaucracy.  
 
Propmaker 
Propmaker is a company who make- and sell propulsion systems to national and international 
shipyards. On a general basis, the company has considerable power in its supplier relationships 
due to having large market share in a limited buyer-market.   
 
In previous years, Propmaker’s supply chain of has been very stable, and the company has 
focused on a strategy of single sourcing and close relations with the first-tier suppliers. In order 
to stay competitive in terms of price in the international market, the company are in the process 
of introducing multiple new suppliers in a multiple sourcing strategy to avoid opportunistic 
pricing behavior from incumbent suppliers. 
 
Propmaker recognize that introducing new and previously “unknown” entities into the supply 
network may increase quality- and delivery-time risk. However, since the margins in the 
industry are low, they consider SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers to be wasteful as the resources 
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spent on conducting it could be spent on other value creating activities. Furthermore, the 
company considers that first-tier suppliers can be trusted to manage risk related to its subsequent 
tier if Propmaker succeeds in thorough ex-ante screening and selection of new suppliers.  
 
Call AS 
Call AS is a largely autonomous department within a large telecommunications company. The 
department procures a large variation of products and services including both software, 
hardware and consultancy. 
 
The departments SCRM efforts changes over time. For new suppliers the primary focus is that 
the chain is not at risk from discontinuity due to liquidity-or solidity issues. If the relationship 
endures and the product-volume reaches a commercial level, the risk-focus changes towards 
CSR and ethical business practices. 
 
In addition to the risk of business discontinuity, Call AS considers supply-side consolidation to 
be a major risk in their supply-chain. If the first-tier suppliers consolidate, they increase their 
relative power in the business relationship, potentially making it challenging for Call AS to 
demand access and create visibility. This is a two-sided coin however, as consolidation 
improves the suppliers ability to satisfy quality- and documentation demands, thereby reducing 
the accompanying risk.  
 
 
3.8 Research setting 
A research setting can be explained as the cultural, social and physical context in which the 
study takes place (Given 2008). We generally distinguish between four main types of research 
settings. The “natural”, where the researcher does not attempt to alter or control the conditions 
of the study, and the post-positivist, experimental and quantitative research settings, where 
every aspect of the environment are optimally controlled by the researcher (Given 2008).  
 
Our research was conducted in a natural setting. The reason for this is that capturing meaning 
in the intersection of information and context was considered valuable- and necessary for 
reaching our research objectives. The geographical setting for our research was Scandinavia. 
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Although some companies were subsidiaries of international companies headquartered 
elsewhere, all cases used in our research were located in Scandinavia.   
3.9  Data collection 
Research data collection can be divided into two categories, primary or secondary data (Hox 
and Boeije 2005). In our master thesis, we have collected both primary and secondary data. 
Collecting primary data can be both costly and time-consuming, however, it brings some 
advantageous as well, for example, we can tailor the research method and theoretical construct 
to suit our research questions (Hox and Boeije 2005).  
This enabled us to gather original data directly from a primary source through interviews, 
tailored specifically to our research questions. Secondary data on the other hand are easily 
accessible and are not to the same extent that time consuming to collect. Other researchers 
originally create secondary data for a different purpose, but if relevant and applicable, it can be 
used for our purpose (Hox and Boeije 2005). Our secondary data consists of buyer-supplier 
contracts, ethical guidelines and CoC’s from the case companies.    
 Interviews  
The technique we used to collect primary data was by conducting interviews with companies 
in different industries, to understand how they assess risk beyond tier-one suppliers. Kvale 
(1996) defines an interview as: “a conversation, whose purpose is to gather descriptions of the 
[life-world] of the interviewee” with respect to interpretation of the meanings of the ‘described 
phenomena”- (Kvale 1996 p.174). In qualitative studies, the human part of the story plays an 
important role, and the results of interviews are co-created work emerging from the interaction 
between researcher and participants (Donalek 2005).  
 
In the majority of the cases we conducted the interviews in a natural setting (their workplace) 
to create an atmosphere where the interviewee is comfortable and at ease, thus enabling the 
interviewee to talk freely (Furgerson and Jacob 2012). However, two of the six interviews were 
conducted via “Voice over Internet Protocol” technologies, which in our case was Skype. This 
eliminated the geographical barrier and enabled us to interview participants that was 
geographically far away from us, while adapting to their time-schedule and eliminating 
traveling costs. A concern we had when doing Skype interviews was the loss of non-verbal cues 
as well as not gaining the participants trust as quickly, as this can enhance the richness of the 
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data (Iacono, Symonds, and Brown 2016). Fortunately, the participants agreed to use video 
while doing the interview, enabling us to see the face and upper body, thus allowing us to notice 
any non-verbal cues. The four interviews we conducted face-to-face were located in close 
proximity to us. 
 
All the interviews were done in the period between February 8th and March 20th 2019. The 
interviews lasted between 25 minutes up to 60 minutes, and all participants were guaranteed 
anonymity. We conducted semi-structured interview with open-ended questions.  
 
This enabled both parties (interviewers and interviewees) to be flexible and more open, 
allowing us as interviewers to follow up on responses we found particularly interesting, and 
getting interviewees to elaborate (Alshenqeeti 2014). The same interview guide was used for 
all cases, with only minor adjustments. This template interview guide can be found in Appendix 
A: interview-guide.  
 
For those participants we had obtained contact details we sent information regarding our 
research and the set of questions we were going to discuss during the interview. Sending 
information prior to the interview enabled them to prepare and reflect on the questions, so when 
the interview commenced they had a better understanding of the research.  
 
Table 3: Interview schedule provides a summary of the schedule and duration of the interviews. 
Table 3: Interview schedule 
Case Date Interview object 
Duration of 
interview 
Shipbuilder February 8th Managing Director 30 Minutes 
Skandi-TV February 13th Purchaser 25 Minutes 
Foodpro February 13th Purchaser 25 Minutes 
HeavyMetal February 19th Managing Director 60 Minutes 
Propmaker March 6th Director of Purchasing 55 Minutes 
Call AS March 20th Department Manager 30 Minutes 
44 
 
 
 
The interviews were all audio-recorded and later transcribed. This was convenient during the 
interview, because it enabled us to focus on the interviewee without taking notes. At a later 
stage, we used the transcriptions to analyze the content, which contributed to our findings in 
chapter 4.2. 
 
 Documents 
Document analysis is often complementary to other forms of qualitative research methods in 
order to ensure triangulation. Triangulation is important to ensure thesis validity and 
corroboration and therefore we supplemented the interviews with document analysis (Ellram 
1996). Document analysis serve a variety of purposes in our research. Firstly, it is possible the 
documents can unravel some information leading to questions to be included in the interview 
(Bowen 2009). Secondly, it can supplement valuable information to the already existing 
knowledge base, and allows us to go in-depth on the material. Furthermore, document analysis 
can verify potential finding from the interviews (Bowen 2009). The proposed advantages 
mentioned above was something we benefitted from in our case studies, as findings in the CoC 
resulted in ideas for questions to use in the interviews. Documents also functioned as 
verification, and it reduced the interviewee bias regarding CoC and contracted related issues 
since we could objectively verify the statements through the documents we possessed. 
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Table 4: Documents analyzed and sorted by case summarizes the documents analyzed for each 
case and the resulting findings. 
 
Table 4: Documents analyzed and sorted by case 
Case Document Findings 
Shipbuilder Code of Conduct 
Reaffirmation of interview findings. 
 
Scandi-TV 
Standardized 
buyer-supplier 
contract 
Reaffirmation of interview findings.  
  Additional findings: 
  
1. The buyer can require the tier-1 supplier 
to change sub-supplier in the case of terms 
of breaches of the contract.   
  
2. Any legal disputes regarding contractual 
agreements are settled in the buying 
organizations home country.  
 
Foodpro Code of Conduct Reaffirmation of interview findings. 
HeavyMetal Code of Conduct Reaffirmation of interview findings. 
Propmaker Code of Conduct Reaffirmation of interview findings. 
Call AS Code of Conduct Reaffirmation of interview findings. 
 
Contracts and CoC contributed to expanded knowledge, and we got an insight in how contracts 
may influence behavior and serve as a risk-mitigator, which we will elaborate on in  
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Chapter 5. The CoC were publically available on the respective company’s website, while the 
buyer-supplier contracts were requested specifically for each case. When examining CoC and 
buyer-supplier contracts respectively, it is worth mentioning that these documents are intended 
for different audiences. While CoC are aimed at the general public, access to the contracts are 
strictly reserved for the buying organization and its supplier.  
 
We also gathered some general information about the company prior to the interview, both 
through their website, but also in news articles. This gave us a holistic understanding of the 
industry they operated in, and gave us an insight in their historical performance and provided 
us with background information. Such background information is valuable during research as 
it helped understand the roots of the phenomenon we were investigating (Bowen 2009).  
 
3.10 Data Analysis   
 
For the collected data to be useful, it needed to be analyzed and understood. As we have 
collected primary data through semi-structured interviews, our data is qualitative. Qualitative 
data refers to all data that are non-numeric, or data that have not been quantified (Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill 2009). However, there does not exist one standardized procedure for 
analyzing qualitative data (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009). Before we began analyzing 
the data, we transcribed our audio-recorded interviews, checked the spellings for error, and had 
it reviewed by our interview objects. 
 
After the interview objects had reviewed the transcripts, we organized in such a way that both 
researched conducted an individual read-through of the transcripts to better comprehend the 
content. Then we discussed different answers, agreed upon different meanings of the data, and 
highlighted what we found interesting. Thereafter, we integrated different data and notes we 
had on the cases and coded each case together in relation to the stated research questions. 
Thereafter, we created a table for each research question, summarizing each respondents 
answer. After we had coded all the cases, we aggregated the analysis into themes, which we 
have presented in Chapter 4. 
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3.11 Validity and reliability 
 
Validity and reliability are traditionally favored measures of research quality in logistics 
research (Halldorsson and Aastrup 2003). As these measures are generally related to the 
positivistic paradigm of quantitative research however, many researchers operating within the 
qualitative realm discard them in favor of terms such as credibility, trustworthiness, 
applicability and confirmability (Strauss and Glaser 1967). Halldorsson and Aastrup (2003) 
claim that this use of alternative measures of judging research quality in logistics is becoming 
more prevalent due to the shift towards a higher prevalence of  qualitative approaches in 
logistics management. And that “The criteria through which research quality is evaluated must 
reflect (or at least take into account) such changes in the discipline”- (Halldorsson and Aastrup 
2003 p.321). 
 
As a method of dichotomizing, the meaning of “quality” in qualitative research from that found 
in the quantitative approaches, we recognize the viability of alternative quality measures. 
However, the qualitative design tests of transferability, dependability, confirmability and 
credibility closely mirror their positivity counterparts external validity, reliability, construct 
validity and internal validity (Riege 2003; Yin 1994). It therefore appears that the difference 
between the two sets of quality measures are largely semantic. 
Table 5: Measures of research quality in the qualitative and quantitative research (Own 
production). shows the corresponding measures of research quality in the Positivistic and 
Realist/Interpretive paradigms. 
 
Table 5: Measures of research quality in the qualitative and quantitative research (Own production).  
Matching measures of research quality 
Positivist Realist/Interpretive 
External validity Transferability 
Reliability Dependability 
Construct validity Confirmability 
Internal validity Credibility 
 
 
48 
 
Riege (2003) collected a set of techniques intended for use by researchers engaged in both 
qualitative and quantitative disciplines to ensure or increase the quality of their research. (An 
adaptation of which can be found in Table 6.  
We used this as framework for presenting the methods and techniques used to ensure the quality 
of our research as well as providing other researchers, business practitioners and readers the 
opportunity to make their own assessments.  
 
Table 6: Validity and reliability measures. Adapted from Riege (2003). 
Measures to: Undertaken 
Increase construct validity Yes No 
Use multiple sources of evidence X   
Establish a chain of evidence X   
Reviewing of drafts by informants   X 
Reviewing of drafts by researchers X   
Internal validity     
Use of cross-case analysis X   
Use of graphs and diagrams in the analysis phase X   
Cross-checking results X   
External validity     
Literal replication   X 
Theoretical replication X   
Definition of scope and boundaries X   
Comparison with existing literature X   
Reliability     
Full account of theories and ideas X   
Accurate observations and actions X   
Using pilot-studies   X 
Use of semi-structured study protocol X   
Use multiple researchers X   
Mechanical data recording X   
Development of case-study database   X 
Parallel findings across data sources X   
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 Construct Validity 
Construct validity relates to establishing suitable operational measures for the concepts being 
studied (Ellram 1996). There are three main methods for establishing construct validity in a 
case study, namely using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain of evidence, and 
review by informants (Ellram 1996). In addition to these three methods, Riege (2003) also 
considers reviewing of drafts by researchers to be a viable technique. 
 
By triangulating data obtained from interviews, buyer-supplier contracts as well as ethical 
guidelines and CoC, our research satisfies the requirements for using multiple sources of 
evidence. All informants agreed to being available for follow-up during the research-period in 
order to clear up misunderstandings, provide additional information and present their view in 
case any discrepancies between data-sources arose. The informants retained the possibility of 
reviewing all information provided by them throughout the research period; however, they were 
not given the opportunity of reviewing drafts of the antecedent findings and analysis.  
 
The rationale behind this is that the anonymization of the research happened right before the 
date of publication, and that allowing the informants to review non-anonymized material could 
compromise sensitive data about other informants. To mitigate this threat to construct validity, 
the responsible researchers and our academic advisor systemically reviewed drafts throughout 
the research period.  
 
Establishing a chain of evidence refers to the process of ensuring that the research follows a 
logical path, allowing the reader insight into how the study is conducted (Ellram 1996). This 
entails everything from the development of research questions and interview protocol to the 
conclusions. In this case study, two external experts- and published academics within the field 
of SCM reviewed the document for continuity, coherence, readability and subject matter. By 
cooperatively making adjustments according to the feedback, we ensured that all these concepts 
reached a satisfactorily level.   
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 Internal validity 
Internal validity can be referred to as: “the isomorphic relationship between the data in an 
inquiry, and the phenomena those data represent”- (Erlandson et al. 1993 p.29-30). Ellram 
(1996) claims that internal validity, as a measure of research quality is only valid for 
explanatory studies, while Riege (2003) finds that there are several ways of increasing/ensuring 
internal validity in case studies. The latter however, does not distinguish between explanatory 
and exploratory research.  
 
According to Riege's (2003) framework, this research uses all available case study design-tests 
for internal validity. In the analysis-phase, we used cross-case analysis as well as within-case 
analysis to extract meaningful information from our data, and utilize graphs and diagrams to 
portray the information in an understandable manner. To further propagate internal validity in 
the data-analysis, cross-checking between different data-sources was undertaken.  
 
Credibility is the corresponding qualitative measure to internal validity (Halldorsson and 
Aastrup 2003; Riege 2003; Erlandson et al. 1993). However, Erlandson et al. (1993) differs 
from the other by defining credibility as “the compatibility of the constructed realities that exist 
in the inquiry’s respondents minds with those that are attributed to them”- (Erlandson et al. 
1993 p.30). Hence, credibility does not exist between the researcher and the audience, but rather 
between the researcher and the inquiry’s informants. To achieve this, they suggest six 
techniques; prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, referential adequacy 
materials, peer debriefing and member checks. From these techniques, our research make use 
of Triangulation (see “Construct Validity”) and member checks by having informants 
reviewing the transcription of their interviews.  
 External Validity 
External Validity or alternatively “transferability” refer to whether the findings of the conducted 
research are generalizable to other businesses and situations than those studied.  Ellram (1996) 
considers the lack of generalizability to have been the major critique of using case studies as a 
research methodology. The three main issues being; the representability – and uniqueness of 
the case and whether it is suitable to generalize into one specific case (Denscombe 2010). 
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Considering our research follows an inductive logic, trying to generate general theories from 
specific cases, ensuring external validity is of the highest importance. Thankfully, the idea that 
case studies cannot generate generalizable finding is a misconception (Ellram 1996; 
Denscombe 2010). However, researchers have to be careful when generalizing from case 
studies, clearly demonstrating how the selected cases are similar to those of its type 
(Denscombe 2010).  
 
 
Denscombe (2010) describes three arguments that adequately rebukes eventual claims of 
lacking generalizability;  
 
Firstly, “although each case is in some aspects unique, it is also a single example of a broader 
class of things”- (Denscombe 2010 p.60).  
 
This means that a unique case will be representable for all cases that share similar 
characteristics.  
 
Secondly, “the extent to which findings from the case study can be generalized to other 
examples in the class depends on how far the case study example is similar to others of its 
type”- (Denscombe 2010 p.60). 
 
The more characteristics shared, the more likely it is that generalization will provide intended 
results. 
 
Thirdly, “reports based on the case study include sufficient details about how the case 
compares to others in the class for the reader to make an informed judgement about how far 
the findings have relevance for other instances”- (Denscombe 2010 p.61). Hence, our research 
must convey enough detail about the circumstances of our cases for the reader to determine 
whether his/her business share enough characteristics for generalization to be feasible. 
 
Ellram (1996) argues that if a broad range of conditions are included in explaining the findings, 
the case study is most likely more generalizable. The number of cases examined is also 
important, with more cases leading to higher generalization. 
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This research makes use of theoretical replication, by selecting cases with different 
characteristics that are likely to produce contrasting results for predictable reasons (Yin 1994). 
Thereby creating a much wider pool of entities which generalizations can be made to. 
 
Tsang (2014) distinguishes between theoretical– and empirical generalization. Empirical 
generalization refers to “whether certain characteristics of a case or sample are typical of the 
population from which the case or sample was drawn or of another population.”- (Tsang 2014 
p.371).  
Theoretical generalization on the other hand entails developing explanations for the variables 
observed in the research (Sharp 1998). Because of the chosen research methodology, we find 
that the case for theoretical generalization in our study is stronger than for empirical 
generalization. This is true for case-studies in general (Tsang 2014), and is further propagated 
by the exploratory methodology. 
 
Riege (2003) propose that defining the scope and boundaries of the research in the research 
design phase increases generalizability. For exploratory research such as ours, this presents a 
challenge, as exploratory research axiomatically relies on the organic development of research 
and for the researchers to go where the findings take them. Because of this, it can be claimed 
that rigidly designed boundaries and scope is diametrically opposed to the concept of 
exploratory research. In the research-design phase leading up to this paper, we determined 
which types of “risk” to incorporate- and exclude, thereby defining the scope for the research 
subject, while the theories and tools used to analyze our findings were defined after reviewing 
the collected data. By doing so we satisfy the requirements for both the definition of scope- and 
boundaries and an exploratory approach.  
 
When analyzing the data, trying to extract key findings, we carried out continuous crosschecks 
against extant literature and theory to ensure that there were viable explanations to support our 
analysis. These forms of comparison between established and general theory and new findings 
contribute to substantiate our research and increase the generalizability of the findings.  
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 Reliability 
In relation to research design quality, reliability can be defined as “whether it can be 
demonstrated that the procedures and operations in the research design can be repeated by 
other researchers and produce similar results”- (Riege 2003). Alternatively, Guba and Lincoln 
(1989) defines it as “the consistency, predictability, dependability, stability and accuracy of a 
study in terms of the phenomena assessed and the instruments used”- (Guba and Lincoln 1989 
p.235). By any of these definitions, an exploratory case study is not “reliable” in the positivistic 
sense. 
 
The qualitative quality test corresponding to reliability is dependability (Denscombe 2010). 
Where reliability concerns invariance of results, dependability seeks to ensure the variances 
traceability. The rationale for dependability is that variance in the outcome of a replicated study 
does not necessarily arise from errors in the research design, but might also be due to changes 
in reality or increased insights (Guba and Lincoln 1989).  
 
Several different techniques were used to increase the dependability and reliability of our 
research. In order for other researchers to pass judgement on whether our decisions regarding 
the research design and data analysis are reasonable, we explained the theories and ideas used 
in all phases of the research. To ensure that the data captured through our case-interviews are 
accurate, we utilized mechanical data recording, capturing the live data by voice-recorder and 
stored it throughout the research period. 
 
Furthermore, a semi-structured interview-guide with only minor adjustments was used for all 
interviews in order to create congruence. Through communication and debate between the two 
researchers, all choices and methodological decisions were examined thoroughly, reducing the 
effects of individual biases- and convictions.  
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Chapter 4 
Findings and analysis 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter presents answers to our research questions on a case-by-case basis, and derives 
from our interview-transcripts. The findings are then analyzed and aggregated into categories. 
The tables below summarize the responses of all cases to each research question (RQ).  
 
Table 7: RQ1 responses 
RQ1: Does the focal company know the identity of their company’s sub-suppliers, and have 
knowledge about their operations? 
CASE NO YES SOMEWHAT 
Shipbuilder X     
Scandi-TV   X   
Foodpro   X   
HeavyMetal     X 
PropMaker X     
Call AS     X 
 
Table 8: RQ2 responses 
RQ2: How does the buying organization assess risk beyond first-tier suppliers? 
CASE       
Shipbuilder Does not assess risk beyond tier-one suppliers. 
Scandi-TV Assigning criticality, examining the external environment and sourcing 
optionality. 
Foodpro By multiplying a criticality score with the probability of the risk happening 
for each type of risk.   
HeavyMetal Does not assess risk beyond tier-one suppliers. 
PropMaker Does not assess risk beyond tier-one suppliers. 
Call AS By examining liquidity and solidity. 
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Table 9:RQ3 responses 
RQ3: How do buying organizations monitor the performance of suppliers beyond tier-one? 
CASE       
Shipbuilder Does not monitor sub-supplier performance. 
Scandi-TV Buyer audits.   
Foodpro Self-evaluation, third party audits, reports from tier-one.  
HeavyMetal Does not monitor sub-supplier performance. 
PropMaker By keeping record on deliveries of products that does not satisfy quality-
standards. 
Call AS Buyer audits, self-evaluation and third-party audits. 
 
Table 10: RQ4 responses 
RQ4: What are the challenges of managing risks beyond tier-one suppliers? 
CASE       
Shipbuilder Does not manage risks beyond tier-one.  
Scandi-TV Selecting the correct sub-suppliers to focus on. Traceability of products. 
Foodpro Labor and capital intensive to monitor all sub-suppliers. 
HeavyMetal Lacking technical knowledge. Risk of provoking the tier-one supplier. 
Gaining access to information about sub-suppliers. 
PropMaker Does not manage risk beyond tier-one. 
Call AS Low transparency and overlapping procedures- and regulations. 
 
Table 11: RQ5 responses 
RQ5: How do buying organizations address these challenges? 
CASE       
Shipbuilder They do not address any challenges. 
Scandi-TV By identifying and evaluating the most critical risks.  
Foodpro By utilizing risk evaluation tools. 
HeavyMetal Open channels of communication. 
PropMaker They do not address any relevant challenges. 
Call AS Not specifically addressed. 
  
4.2 Findings 
 Shipbuilder 
Shipbuilder outsources about 90% of production, however, they do not know the identity of 
their company’s sub-suppliers nor do they have intricate knowledge about their operations. 
Consequently, the other research questions cannot be properly answered by Shipbuilding, as 
they do not assess risk, monitor the performance, and are unaware of the challenges of managing 
risk beyond tier-one suppliers.  
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Shipbuilder explained that a combination of their industry operating with a lot of trust, lack of 
resources, and the good relationships with their tier-one suppliers had been a reason to not get 
involved with their sub-suppliers. However, they acknowledge that being involved with their 
sub-suppliers could be beneficial when dealing with capacity problems, overall project 
planning, and delivery time. As stated by the interview object in response to questions on the 
potential advantages of having more information about their sub-suppliers:  
 
“It would provide big advantages regarding project planning, and reduce ad-hoc 
adjustments. In addition, it would help us in ensuring that the sub-supplier have the 
necessary capacity, that the product arrive in time and that the quality is as promised.”  
 
 Scandi-TV 
Scandi-TV knows the identity of their company’s sub-suppliers, and have knowledge about 
their operations. However, the products they source are very complex, and a product containing 
3-5 main components may be a result of 1000 of other small components put together. 
Understandably, Scandi-TV do not have intricate knowledge about all of the 1000 sub-suppliers 
operations involved in their products, as the interview object explained: 
 
“It’s mainly about being selective in what you want to look into based on the risk 
criteria. I think that is the most difficult part in a way, to sit and define what is the 
most critical thing in the whole 1000 components box you get. Which to focus on and 
dive into.” 
 
Since they cannot have intricate knowledge about 1000 sub-suppliers, they assign the 
components with different criticality scores, and actively pursue those with the highest score. 
In addition to this, they are actively mapping alternative sourcing options to the products they 
procure, and examine the external environment. Scandi-TV has a high focus on sub-supplier 
monitoring and performance, and dedicate time and resources to perform frequent audits 
beyond tier-one suppliers themselves.  
 
 
According to Scandi-TV, the biggest challenge to managing risk beyond tier-one suppliers is 
selecting the correct sub-supplier to focus on, and the traceability on certain components. 
Scandi-TV’s strategy for better traceability is to cooperate with tier-one suppliers (which they 
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have a good relationship with) to get knowledge about the tier-two supplier, who can connect 
them to the tier-three and so on. They do this to ensure visibility and reducing risk as far down 
the supply chain as possible, which in most cases work perfectly fine.  
 
Unfortunately, some of the products in their components, for example minerals, are difficult to 
trace all the way to the source. To select the correct sub-suppliers Scandi-TV identifies and 
evaluates self-defined risks, for example poor working conditions, child labor, product 
criticality, and procurement cost. Based on the criticality evaluation, they actively seek to 
eradicate these risks.    
 Foodpro 
Foodpro knows the identity of their supplier and have knowledge about their operations, but 
similarly to Scandi-TV, they have so many sub-suppliers that it is virtually impossible to have 
intricate knowledge about each sub-suppliers operations. Since Foodpro have such a vast 
supplier network, they have developed their own risk assessment matrix to better understand 
which sub-suppliers and product have a higher risk profile. The assessment matrix is a 
combination of factors like criticality for their business, CSR-related risks, how difficult it is to 
source the product etc., and they give each of these factors an individual score.  
 
When Foodpro put those scores together they get a CRS on each product, and then they can 
make a rational decision about which product they should focus on. For example, if a company 
has an extremely high CSR-score and they decide to focus on this specific supplier, the goal is 
to improve this sub-supplier by auditing and giving feedback to what needs to improve in order 
to conduct business with Foodpro. The interview object elaborated:  
 
“So, it’s mainly helping them improve, and not just like cutting them out. Because the 
risk will risk not disappear, because somebody, somewhere, will still do business with 
them and the problem will still exist. Therefore, it is mostly helping them improve 
rather than cutting them out completely” 
 
 
Foodpro uses a variety of methods to monitor the performance of their sub-suppliers, including 
self-evaluation forms, third party audits and reports from their tier-one supplier.  
When it comes to the latter, they receive aggregated knowledge about different regions where 
the product is sourced. This information comes from their tier-one supplier. Furthermore, they 
58 
 
use third-party audits and have the opportunity to join the tier-one suppliers audit team when 
they conduct audits of the lower-tiers.  
 
Foodpro’s view on self-evaluation is that is needs to be adjusted specifically to each region so 
that there are no misunderstandings, because if you send the same self-evaluation form to a 
company based in Asia and Europe, their experience is that the form would be misinterpreted. 
In addition, the self-evaluation form should be adjusted to the specific risks the sub-suppliers 
are more likely to experience. The biggest challenge Foodpro face when it comes to managing 
risks beyond tier-one is that it is to labor and capital intensive to monitor all the sub-suppliers. 
 
This particular challenge is difficult to eradicate, because if you want to do thorough monitoring 
and assessments of a sub-supplier, it is labor and cost consuming. To address the challenge, 
Foodpro utilize the CRS to make sure that the time and money they do spend on monitoring 
and assessments are at least spent on the right sub-suppliers.  
 HeavyMetal 
The level of HeavyMetal’s SCV varies based on the purchasing cost of the product category. 
For custom processed metal-products, which is a big expenditure, the company has knowledge 
about sub-suppliers at tier-two level, while for standardized items; visibility only extends to 
tier-one. As stated in the “Case Descriptions” chapter, HeavyMetal also procures customized 
electronic products. For this category, the visibility-frontier is also at tier-one, and the company 
expects that the tier-one suppliers would be reluctant to disclose their subsequent tiers if 
petitioned to do so.  
 
HeavyMetal acknowledges that the lower tiers of the supply chain can influence SCR, but do 
not assess risk beyond first-tier suppliers, nor monitor their performance. Although HeavyMetal 
does not monitor the performance of sub-suppliers, nor conduct any other SCRM initiatives 
aimed specifically at suppliers beyond tier-one, they specify some of the challenges that would 
accompany such efforts.  
One challenge is the lack of technical, product-specific knowledge. This is especially relevant 
for components and parts that are not considered part of the company’s core product, and may 
affect the ability to effectively manage quality and delivery-time risk. Other challenges include 
getting the tier-one supplier to disclose its suppliers, and conducting monitoring of these 
without provoking the tier-one supplier. As the managing director of HeavyMetal stated: 
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“By maintaining an open dialogue, we find out much more than if we use the 
contracts, in which case the supplier will simply «shut down» and we will only get the 
information they are legally obligated to give us.” 
 
Since HeavyMetal does not manage SCR beyond tier-one, it does not have any strategies in 
place to overcome these challenges. However, they include a large time-buffer in their project 
plan to mitigate the effects of risk on delivery time, thereby increasing the company’s risk 
tolerance.  
 Propmaker 
Propmaker’s visibility frontier extends to tier-one suppliers, thus they do not know whom their 
lower-tier suppliers are- or have intricate knowledge about their operations. The company does 
not assess risk, nor monitor performance of sub-suppliers on a general basis. The reason for 
this, in the words of the director of purchasing is that 
 
“It should not necessary to do monitoring regularly; it should be reserved for special 
cases where there is a specific need.” 
 
 Propmaker does record sub-standard deliveries, and audits the companies who do not deliver 
according to contract; however, this only applies to tier-one.     
Because the company does not proactively manage risk beyond tier-one, they have not 
experienced any challenges related to SCRM, nor adopted any strategies for solving those 
challenges.  
 
Although Propmaker does not consider this to be a strategy related to SCRM, they use long 
time-horizons and buffers in their projects in order to mitigate the negative consequences of 
quality risk (the need to order replacement products) and delayed deliveries.  
 Call AS 
On a general basis, Call AS has a strong degree of control over the lower-tiers of suppliers in 
their supply chain. The procurement department within the company is obligated to map the 
supply chain down to the lowest level for compliance purposes. This is true for all products that 
reach the commercial stage, thus having a high purchase volume. For small batches of products 
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that are in for testing or internal use however, the degree of visibility required is much lower, 
and efforts to ensure compliance are therefore equally reduced.  
 
The products procured by Call AS are often highly technical, requiring up-to-date technical 
insight. It can be challenging for the procurement department to keep up with the rapidly 
changing development in the field, and R&D specialists are therefore integrated in the 
procurement teams to make sure the department gain the necessary insight and understanding 
of the operations of companies in Call AS’s supply chain.  
 
As stated in the case description, business continuity risk is a great concern for Call AS as they 
are often doing business with firms that are small and/or newly formed. To asses this risk, the 
company evaluates data regarding solidity and liquidity found in the companies’ balance sheets.  
 
In terms of monitoring, Call AS relies on audits conducted by special audit-teams within the 
purchasing department. These audits on the suppliers beyond tier-one, are run irrespective of 
who the tier-one suppliers are and what monitoring procedures they have in place. On one hand 
Call AS recognizes that the need for monitoring may be greater when new suppliers are 
introduced into the supply chain, however all companies are subject to the same procedures.  
 
“If they are selling something completely new, large amount of simple work, and then 
they go into a different line of business, then we probably audit that. But maybe not 
when we extend the existing contract for the same product.” 
 
In addition to audits conducted by Call AS, the company uses supplier self-evaluation and third 
party auditors.   
 
 
One challenge Call AS faces in their effort to monitor sub-supplier performance and compliance 
is a lack of transparency in the process due to the high number of people and organizational 
levels involved. This problem is most acute when the tier-one supplier is also a large company 
with its own extensive monitoring regime. Another problem is that Call AS experience a high 
degree of supply-side consolidation, which creates lower sourcing optionality and increases the 
company’s dependence on the supplier. Thirdly, the pace of business dealings and rapidity of 
technological change makes the window for conducting audits and the time-period for validity 
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of gathered information shorter. Of the problems mentioned, the latter two are largely outside 
Call AS control, and there is little the company can do to address them aside for trying to find 
sourcing alternatives for high volume products and use open source-codes for software 
development. As for the challenges regarding transparency, the data acquired does not suggest 
that any measures are taken to resolve the problem.  
 
4.3 Analysis 
 Do managers know the identity of their company’s sub-suppliers? 
Moreover, if so, do they have intricate knowledge about their 
operations? 
 
The gathered data suggest that there are large variations between companies when it comes to 
whether they know the identity and operations of their sub-suppliers. A large proportion of 
companies knows neither the identity nor the operations of their lower-tier suppliers. One 
common denominator amongst the companies with low visibility is that they operate in 
industries with low profit margins. This may signalize that the importance placed on creating 
SCV compared to other business-areas is relatively low. 
 
On a general basis, companies are more likely to know the identity of their sub-suppliers than 
to have intricate knowledge about their operations. Based on the necessary effort to create these 
two “layers” of visibility, this finding is logical. In case of companies who actively focus on 
SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers, they all appear to have visibility regarding the identity of 
their sub-suppliers down to the lowest tier. One exception to this “rule” is the case of certain 
metals that are very difficult to trace.  
As for having intricate knowledge about the operations of sub-suppliers, one important 
determinant appears to be the extent of the supply network (number of actors). Where the extent 
of the supply network is relatively low, the focal organization has intricate knowledge about all 
sub-suppliers operations, while more extensive supply networks necessitates the selection of a 
sub-set of suppliers due to restrictions of cost, time and manpower.   
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 How do buying organizations assess risks beyond tier-one suppliers? 
 
How buying organization assess risk beyond first-tier suppliers depend on what form of risk is 
being assessed. For example, quality, and delivery-time risk can be assessed by examining and 
recording historical performance. This however relies on tracing the root cause of the errors 
back to the responsible sub-suppliers if the problem does not stem from tier-one.  
Business continuity risk is generally easy to assess by reviewing sub-suppliers balance sheets 
and other financial documents. The accessibility of documents either openly or by request is a 
prerequisite for the feasibility of these assessments.  
 
For the assessment of risk related to disruptions due to regulatory changes or natural 
catastrophes, focal firms rely on aggregate analysis of the external environment the sub-
suppliers operates within. This relates to both regulatory/political regimes, regional 
susceptibility to weather-related incidents and the optionality in the supply-market for the 
products in question.  
 
The aforementioned assessment types and techniques all relate to the probability of a specific 
risk-type to occur or its consequences. Most companies do not place equal important on all 
forms of risk, thus it becomes advantageous to have an assessment tool that allows the focal-
company to incorporate their own perceived criticality. One such tool is a CRS, an example of 
which is presented in Table 12: Compound Risk Score example. (Own production). 
Table 12: Compound Risk Score example. (Own production) 
Compound Risk Score 
Risk-type Criticality(1-10)  Likeliness(1-10) Computed 
CSR 10 3 30 
Delivery-time 5 6 30 
Quality 2 4 8 
Disruption 7 8 56 
Compound Risk Score Company X 124 
 
Criticality is a key concept when it comes to risk assessment beyond first-tier suppliers, and 
should be one of the main decision-variables when it comes to deciding what and who to 
monitor. Note that criticality can refer to both the impact of a risk-element, but also to the role 
of a purchased product or component to the focal firm’s main product. Since a small 
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inexpensive component can sometimes be vital to a larger high value product or service, it could 
be advisable to curtail “value” as a determinant of assessment.   
 
While the CRS presents a holistic approach to risk assessment, there is an alternative way to 
assess risk related to suppliers beyond the first-tier. This second view places even higher value 
on criticality and involves finding the few most critical areas/risk/products for the focal firm 
and conduct SCRM efforts towards lower-tier suppliers with these as a solitary focus.  
 
 How do buying organizations monitor the performance of suppliers 
beyond tier-one (subcontractors)? 
Buying organizations monitor sub-supplier performance in five different ways. By sub-supplier 
self-reporting, reports from tier-one suppliers, audits by the focal organization, third party 
audits, and witness points. There are slight variations in how focal organizations use self-
evaluation forms as a monitoring practice. The data suggests self-evaluations take the form of 
either a checklist or a questionnaire. The common denominator is that it is adapted to the risk 
areas the focal firm might encounter with that specific sub-supplier, and that the self-evaluation 
form can be a decider to increase monitoring for the sub-suppliers.  
Another way to monitor sub-suppliers is by receiving aggregated information from the tier-one 
suppliers.  
 
A prerequisite for this type of monitoring is that both the focal firm and the tier-one suppliers 
have a common interest in monitoring the sub-suppliers. If the focal firm have a power-
dependence disadvantage it would be virtually impossible to dictate the tier-one supplier to first 
monitor the sub-suppliers, and then provide the information to the focal firm. 
The data also shows that some companies prefer to conduct the auditing of their sub-supplier 
themselves, by utilizing their own audit team/quality team. It might be fruitful for the focal firm 
to perform the audit themselves, since the team is competent and possess great knowledge about 
their own customers and the final use of the product, making it easier to know the quality 
requirements to run the audit on sight.  
Third party monitoring is another way to organize monitoring, and ensure that sub-suppliers 
operate ethically, and deliver high quality products. The third-party auditing reports may have 
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higher credibility when the intended audience is outside of the focal company as the auditors 
have little or no vested interest in the audit results.  
 
In some cases, the tier-one supplier can audit their own suppliers and send their auditing reports 
to the focal company for review. In these cases, the relationship between the focal firm and 
their supplier was good, and they got invitations to join those on sight audits on a regular basis. 
As both parties had an interest in monitoring and improving their sub-suppliers, organizing the 
auditing in this manner was beneficial for both parties. 
 
The last form of monitoring we encountered was the witness points. This contractual agreement 
ensures that the focal company are notified when certain parts of production commences, and 
the focal firm then send a team to oversee the production. This type of monitoring allows the 
focal company to assess the process and receive direct information on quality issues or setbacks 
in production.  
 
To summarize, there are numerous ways to monitor sub-suppliers, and it seems to be situational 
how companies approach monitoring. Factors such as the industry firms operate in, power-
dependency relationship between focal firm and its suppliers, as well as available resources are 
factors that decide to what extent firms monitor sub-suppliers, and what techniques they use. 
 
 
 What are the challenges of managing risk beyond tier-one suppliers? 
 
The challenges concerning SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers can be separated into two 
categories; challenges that hinder companies from conducting SCRM, and challenges they 
experience when conducting SCRM-related work.  
 
In the first category, a major challenge is that the first-tier suppliers are unwilling to disclose 
information about the subsequent tiers. A second challenge is that the focal company needs to 
allocate enough available resources in terms of personnel and money to conduct SCRM work.  
For companies who are already managing risk beyond first-tier suppliers, challenges still 
include resource-limitations on personnel, time and money that place restrictions on the extent 
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of SCRM efforts. This forces companies to be selective regarding which sub-suppliers and 
functional areas to include in SCRM-work.  
 
A second challenge is the issue of transparency in the SCRM process. Where there are many 
people and several organizational levels involved in the risk management process it becomes 
increasingly challenging to keep track of- and coordinate activities. This challenge is 
particularly prevalent in situations where several organizations in the supply-chain conducts 
SCRM, and incudes potential outcomes such as overlapping procedures which creates 
unnecessary expenditure, and unrecognized monitoring gaps.   
 
  How do buying organizations address the challenges of managing risk 
beyond tier-one suppliers? 
 
To address the challenge of getting resources allocated to conduct SCRM, our data suggest that 
it might be fruitful to focus on the role of CSR in hindering- or negating the negative PR-effects 
of a CSR incident at sub-supplier level. CSR however, is only one element within SCRM, and 
there is no evidence in our data to suggest that highlighting the risk-mitigating effects of CSR 
would encourage top-management to allocate more resources to other SCRM-issues.  
Where the problem of having enough resources to conduct SCRM stems from low margins, low 
capital reserves rather than low support from top-management, counteracting it has no “easy-
fix”.  
It is worth noting that a focal company, which cannot afford the expense of conducting SCRM, 
can neither afford the consequences of large-scale disruptions to its supply chain or continuous 
sub-standard performance.  
 
In situations where the first-tier supplier acts as a barrier to SCRM by restricting the focal 
company’s access to information about the lower tiers of the supply chain, the options for the 
buying firm are meagre. The optimal solution is to find a first-tier supplier that either has more 
beneficial stance on supply-chain transparency, or in regards to which the buying organization 
has enough power in the relationship to demand access. If such an option does not exist, the 
data suggest that the best option for the buying firm is to avoid conflict and maintain open 
channels of communication to facilitate the exchange of tacit-knowledge.  
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The challenge of selecting which suppliers to focus on in SCRM when the supply-network is 
expansive is addressable, but not without effort. It does require that the focal company have 
done a complete supply-chain mapping so that it at least knows the identity of all actors in the 
supply chain as well as which products and services they contribute with to the supply chain. 
Furthermore, the focal company must collect data on the external environment of all actors. 
This includes the regulatory- and political environment, regional predisposition to 
weather/climate related incidents and alternative sources of supply. Lastly, the focal company 
must evaluate the criticality of each risk-type to their business, ceteris paribus.  
 
When all of this information is compiled, the focal company has the necessary data to conduct 
a risk analysis, using a tool such as the CRS described in Table 12: Compound Risk Score 
example. (Own production). After doing so for all sub-suppliers and creating a database for 
compound risk scorecards, the focal firm can easily sort the sub-suppliers by score and select 
the ones with highest aggregate scores as targets for SCRM. How many sub-suppliers to select 
depends on the budget-restrictions.  
 
 Chapter summary and additional findings 
This chapter presented the findings and analysis of the study. Overall, we find that there are 
large variations in SCV, and that buying firms are more likely to know the identity of their sub-
supplier than to have intricate knowledge about their operations.  
Those companies that actively assess risk beyond tier-one focus generally focus on either 
product-criticality or the availability of alternative suppliers. Not all companies monitor sub-
supplier performance, but amongst those that do, behavioral monitoring such as supplier self-
evaluation, buyer audits and third-party audits are feasible methods. Sub-supplier performance 
can also be monitored by output monitoring if complemented with additional efforts. 
 
The challenges concerning SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers can be separated into two 
categories; challenges that hinder companies from conducting SCRM, and challenges they 
experience when conducting SCRM-related work. For the former, unfavorable power-
dependency towards the tier-one supplier is the main issue, while selection-problems are the 
main challenge for the latter.  
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In addition to this, the study has produced several interesting findings that are relevant for 
SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers, but are not addressed directly by our research questions. 
Those findings are presented in the following paragraphs.  
 
Information-flow between tiers in the supply-chain is hierarchical, with little or no direct 
information flow between tiers that are not subsequent, leaving it slow and susceptible to 
distortions. One potential reason for this is that each tier acts as sorting device, distributing 
information based on the requirements and needs of the next tier in the supply chain. Because 
there is no direct contact between the focal organizations and the sub-suppliers, investigating 
SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers, requires researchers to analyze the relationship between 
focal-firm and tier-one suppliers.  
 
Focal companies who use contingency planning for sourcing optionality as a mitigation strategy 
does not evaluate whether the alternative suppliers have sufficient free capacity to 
accommodate their required purchasing quantity.  
 
SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers is a multi-theoretical discipline that is not adequately 
addressable by using a single theory. Whether it is possible for a focal company to conduct 
SCRM can be explained by power-dependence theory. Whether it is beneficial is explained by 
TCT and SET, while RDT explains which suppliers and products to focus on.  
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
5.1 Chapter Introduction 
The objective of this research has been to uncover new knowledge about SCRM beyond first-
tier suppliers, thereby contributing to closing a major research gap within the field.  We have 
done so by utilizing a multiple case study with theoretical replication-logic to examine existing 
practice, and through reviewing extant literature within adjacent academic fields, adapting 
existing theory to use beyond tier-one suppliers. In this chapter, we will elaborate on our 
analysis, challenge our findings and evaluate their fit with existing knowledge.  
 
5.2 Knowledge about the identity and operations of sub-
suppliers 
In our sample, we found that there are different degrees of visibility in the supply chain. While 
some firms do not know the identity nor the operations of their sub-suppliers, others have more 
visibility in their supply chain and intricate knowledge of sub-supplier operations. Logically, 
the focal firm cannot choose an approach to manage risk beyond first-tier suppliers when those 
entities are unknown. When firms do not manage risk beyond tier-one suppliers, they become 
unable to influence existing risks, thus they are more vulnerable to risks that may affect their 
daily operations. Interestingly, some of the negative effects firms stated they encounter when 
they were unaware of the sub-suppliers identity could be mitigated by increasing the visibility 
in the supply chain. Bartlett, Julien, and Baines (2007) findings on visibility indicate that there 
are significant improvements in both schedule adherence and overall supply chain performance. 
 
However, even if the focal firms actively try to pursue these benefits by increasing the visibility, 
their first-tier supplier might be lacking the same interest.  
 
The power-dependence in a buyer-supplier dyad may therefore affect the visibility, and Nguyen 
et al. (2017) study show that those who have dependency on their supplier are more reliant on 
visibility to mitigate risks, and vice versa. Thus, if the supplier with high relative power does 
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not want to commit to SCRM strategies, it is difficult to implement. With the increased 
complexity of supply chains in recent decades, there has been an emphasis in academia on 
collaboration and strategic coordination across businesses to improve the overall supply chain 
performance. However, the actual practicing of SCM (and SCRM) in the majority of our sample 
takes place to a limited degree and does not fulfill the envisioned theoretical scope for neither 
SCM nor SCRM. Our data suggests that it is more likely the management of supply chains take 
place between the focal firm and the first-tier suppliers, which Ballou's (2007) paper 
corroborates.  
 
On the contrary, those firms that conduct SCRM beyond tier-one do their best to manage risk 
all the way to the raw material. This seems reasonable because, in theory, if they only have 
knowledge up to their tier-two supplier for example, they would still be vulnerable to unknown 
risk from tier-three and beyond. Furthermore, those who conduct SCRM all the way to the raw 
material have the financial capacity to do so, unlike industries with low margins were SCRM 
and visibility are often not a priority. Our findings also indicate the complexity of the supply 
network affects the SCRM initiatives; more suppliers mean more complexity and increased 
difficulty to implement full visibility. We argue that this is interconnected with available 
resources and finances, since implementing SCRM initiatives are both cost and time 
consuming.  
 
Even the firms who had intricate knowledge of their sub-suppliers operations, did not operate 
on shared IT-platforms, and thus the information was not something they could monitor 
constantly in real-time. This is unfortunate since shared systems is important to realize the 
benefits of visibility. Our conclusion on visibility is similar to other papers e.g. (Li et al. 2015; 
Nguyen et al. 2017; C. S. Tang 2006) that visibility is an important proactive approach to 
mitigating supplier risk for the buying firm. 
 
    
 
5.3 Risk assessment beyond first-tier suppliers 
Organizations use different tools and strategies to assess risk beyond first-tier suppliers. This is 
due to the variations of industries, the relationships with their first-tier suppliers and the 
characteristics of their sub-suppliers products. When it came to assessing quality and delivery 
70 
 
related risk, firms looked at the historical performance. That approach gives an overview of the 
amount of deviations related to quality or delivery time. If there are frequent deviations, the 
firm pursue the sub-supplier responsible and implement strategies to eradicate the problems. 
Surely, this approach has its advantages and help firms tackle issues in their supply chain. 
However, other risk assessment tools should supplement this approach, because firms are acting 
on issues that have already affected them, meaning it will not prevent the issues to occur in the 
first place. 
  
Firms are also vary of the financial aspects of their sub-suppliers, where some of the firms in 
our sample highlighted the importance of business continuity and the related risks. Especially 
in the screening phase of a new supplier, it is important to examine their financial reports, to 
ensure their sub-supplier are not in risk of going bankrupt.  
 
Business continuity risk is relatively easy to assess, and the focal firm can review the sub-
suppliers balance sheets and other financial documents. The consequences of not assessing 
business continuity risks might be higher than the cost of performing one. Depending on the 
product they deliver, it might be complicated and time consuming to replace the bankrupt sub-
supplier, thus we argue that the focal firm should conduct this assessment not only for new 
suppliers, but also for already established relationships.  
Some firms also assess the risk related to disruptions in their supply chain and having a 
proactive approach towards it. 
 
Knowing when a disruption might affect the company is virtually impossible, but assessing the 
risk and doing the due diligence is a proactive approach, which enables firms to prepare for 
regulatory and political shifts in the area the sub-suppliers operate. The actual assessments are 
done by receiving aggregate analysis of the external environment sub-supplier operate in. 
Certain areas are more susceptible to weather related incidents, and by being proactive, the 
focal firm can have other sourcing opportunities readily available if disruption strikes. 
 
It is possible all of the aforementioned risks are something the focal firm would encounter with 
multiple sub-suppliers in their supply chain. If so, it would be convenient to prioritize which 
sub-suppliers are critical to the company, and the probability of certain risks affecting the 
company. 
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The CRS allows the company to incorporate the risk they perceive to be most critical to their 
operations and based on the total risk score, they can pursue those sub-suppliers with the highest 
score first. In existing literature, we find that other practitioners have similar methods like the 
aforementioned CRS, where they combine probability and impact in a risk map/matrix. 
However, Ericsson found that the assigning “risk value” (impact multiplied with probability) is 
not always easy to use nor understand for business people (Norrman and Jansson 2004). 
Therefore, they focus on the financial impact when assessing which product or sub-supplier to 
focus on. Ericsson calculate the financial value of impact by multiplying gross margin with 
“business recovery time”, plus extra cost such as inventory carrying, idle capacity, labor and 
equipment. While there are different alterations to the risk matrix, the objective remains the 
same: to uncover which sub-suppliers to look into, and use this information to decide which 
approach the focal firm should implement for mitigating the risks.  
 
When it comes to risk assessments in supply chains, we agree with existing theory, which 
argues that identifying, and assessing possible risks and their impact in a supply chain is a 
complex task. This is due to the multiple nodes and links in a supply chain, where companies 
must identify risks directly linked to their products, but also uncover all the risks involved with 
the different linkages between other suppliers. Gilbert and Gips (2000) found that while 
assessing sub-supplier risks are feasible, costs increase and it gets less practical to analyze the 
exposure of a supplier’s sub-supplier. Thus, the further upstream you assess risk the more 
difficult it becomes, amplifying the need to utilize, for example, CRS to pursue the most critical 
sub-suppliers first. 
 
Furthermore, when Harland, Brenchley, and Walker (2003) conducted four case studies on the 
electronic sector, they concluded that less than 50% of the risks in the supply chain was visible 
to the focal firm.  
 
This emphasis the importance of thorough supply chain assessments to reduce the focal firm’s 
vulnerability, but at the same time indicating that there is much potential still, for increasing 
visibility and risk assessments in supply chains.  
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5.4 Performance monitoring beyond first-tier suppliers 
We find that there are two categories of monitoring performance beyond first-tier suppliers. 
Direct monitoring of sub-suppliers, which can take form of sub-supplier self-evaluations, buyer 
audits and third-party audits, and indirectly by monitoring the monitoring efforts of suppliers. 
The latter is done through reviewing audit-reports and evaluating monitoring strategy. This 
form of indirect monitoring of both tier-one and lower-tier suppliers is given special attention 
in the monitoring regime of Ericsson (Jansson and Norrman 2004), suggesting that it has merit 
beyond the first-tier.   
Irrespective of monitoring categorizations and specific techniques, most companies monitor the 
performance of sub-suppliers in one way or another. For direct sub-supplier monitoring the 
focus appears to be on the sub-suppliers adherence to standards regarding ethics and 
compliance, while quality- and other product related risks are the responsibility of suppliers. 
There are several reasons why this division is sensible. If we look at the effect of a product 
quality deficiency originating at sub-supplier level, the focal organization is unlikely to bear the 
financial responsibility. If the tier-one supplier detects the deficiency, the cost of replacement 
goods will be assigned to either the sub-supplier or the tier-one supplier (depending of terms of 
their contract). If the deficiency is discovered by the focal organization upon receiving the 
goods, buyer-supplier contracts will according to our findings often include clauses that either 
requires the supplier to send replacement products or allows the focal organization to source 
comparable products at the tier-one suppliers expense.  
 
Another argument for assigning the duty of performance monitoring regarding quality to a sub-
suppliers subsequent downstream buyer is that they are more likely to have product-specific 
technical expertise exceeding that of the focal organization, making it easier to conduct 
effective monitoring.  
 
In the case sub-supplier performance in CoC-compliance on the other hand, the detection of 
sub-standard performance will have immediate impact on the focal organization, making it 
more critical for the organization to monitor it themselves. 
All companies in our sample who engaged in direct sub-supplier monitoring used supplier self-
evaluation as a part of their monitoring process. This could be because of their simplicity and 
inexpensive nature. Despite their applicability, sub-supplier self-evaluation only appears to be 
complementary to other forms of monitoring. Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990) finds that 
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the two main benefits of monitoring are the discouragement or discovery opportunistic behavior 
and improved purchasing performance. If an outside party does not check the information 
provided by the sub-supplier in self-evaluation forms, using them does not reduce the sub-
suppliers room for opportunistic behavior. If the focal company conducts audits however, the 
self-evaluation forms may serve as a baseline to which the audit-results can be compared. 
  
The focal organization has two different methods of direct auditing of sub-suppliers, namely 
buyer-audits and third-party audits. Which type focal organizations should utilize is situational. 
If the audit is based on the focal-company`s internal ethical guidelines/CoC, an audit team from 
the focal company is likely to have more intricate knowledge about the program than third-
party auditors. Furthermore, doing the audits themselves allows for updating and improving 
both codes-and auditing routines over time based on the gathered experience. 
 
One of the weaknesses of buyer-audits compared to third-party audits is their lack of credibility 
in the eyes of external stakeholders due to the vested interest of the focal organization. These 
external stakeholders may include both buyers/consumers, and certification-agencies who 
accredit companies based their audits CSR and compliance efforts. Where the audit is based 
around industry standards rather than the focal company`s own ethical guidelines and CoC’s, 
third party certification-agencies may also have more intricate knowledge and experience about 
how to conduct the audit successfully.  
 
Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan (2007) utilize two types of monitoring. Behavioral monitoring, 
which can be defined as “evaluating the processes that are expected to produce the focal 
outcome”- (Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 2007 p.426) include the aforementioned auditing and 
self-evaluation forms. Where behavioral monitoring evaluates processes, “output monitoring” 
involves evaluating the results.  
 
 
 
Within our sample there was one example of output monitoring where the focal organization 
kept track of deficiencies within incoming orders and using that information to determine 
whether or not to conduct more intrusive monitoring. For monitoring sub-supplier performance 
however, output monitoring alone is not a functioning approach unless the focal company traces 
deficiencies to a specific sub-supplier. This requires SCV and the use of root cause analysis. If 
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the focal company can both trace deficiencies and has a procedure for conducting root-cause 
analysis, output monitoring can be a functional, although reactive way of monitoring sub-
supplier performance in terms of quality. 
 
 
As stated by Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan (2007) behavioral monitoring  can be perceived as 
more intrusive than output-monitoring. The question of access and power-dependence therefore 
becomes relevant. If the sub-supplier has a power advantage over the monitor and does not 
agree to behavioral monitoring, output monitoring may be a “second-best” option.   
 
Our findings suggest that there is a substitutive relationship between screening and monitoring 
of sub-suppliers, thereby concurring extant theory on monitoring in buyer-supplier relationships 
e.g.(Ittner et al. 1999; Heide and Stump 1995), but not to the degree that focal companies can 
select one instead of the other.  
 
5.5 Challenges to- and solutions for managing risk beyond first-
tier suppliers 
Our findings suggest that all companies’ face challenges regarding SCRM beyond first-tier 
suppliers. The challenges are diverse in nature, grounded in different theories and require 
distinctly separate solutions. We find it appropriate to group the challenges into two categories; 
“Barriers” that hinder focal organizations from engaging in SCRM beyond tier-one suppliers, 
and “Impediments” which we define as challenges faced when engaging in SCRM.  
 
 
 
 
 
Barriers 
Visibility and access 
In light of the finding that information-flow in all supply-chains in our sample is hierarchical 
with information siphoned through each tier both upstream and downstream, focal companies 
largely depend on their supplier for information on their lower-tiers. Thus, the relationship 
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between the focal organization and their first-tier supplier becomes a determinant of whether 
the focal organization has the opportunity to gain access and visibility in the lower tiers of the 
supply chain.  
 
Based on our findings and extant theory within power dependence e.g.(Emerson 1962) we 
define four categories that firms may find themselves in regarding their relationships with tier-
one supplier and its implications for SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers. These categories are 
listed and described in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: The four stances within SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers (own production) 
The four stances on SCRM-beyond tier-one 
Stance Description 
 
Control The buying organization is actively mapping the supply chain, creating visibility and 
attempting to manage risk beyond first-tier suppliers. It can do so because it holds a 
favorable bargaining position with the immediate supplier, can dictate terms and 
require the disclosure of information. 
 
Cooperation The buying organization and its first -tier supplier can cooperate in conducting SCRM 
and share information- and responsibility irrespective of power-dependencies due to 
goal congruence and similar SCRM understanding. 
 
Dependency Due to the weak comparative negotiating position the buying organization has with 
its tier-one supplier it cannot extract information about the lower tiers of the SC. It is 
therefore entirely reliant on the supplier when it comes to SCRM beyond tier-one.  
 
Trusting The buying organization has the opportunity to manage SCR beyond first-tier 
suppliers, either by assuming a "Control" or "Cooperation" stance. Nevertheless, it 
chooses not to do so because of a high level of trust in its suppliers. 
 
Focal companies fitting the “Control” or “Cooperation” descriptions are in situations where it 
is possible to conduct SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers. Those fitting the “Dependency” 
category much less so, while the “Trusting” companies choose not to.  
 
 
“Control” and “dependency” are adverse concepts that fit Emerson`s (1962) findings on power 
and dependence in that the former, the power of the “controlling” company can overcome the 
resistance of their “dependent” tier-one supplier towards sharing information about the lower 
tiers. The opposite is true for focal companies in the “dependent” category.  
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For the “trusting” category, their inactivity can be explained by extant literature in SET and 
more specifically on the concept of affective trust and trust in competency  (Ha, Park, and Cho 
2011). 
 
In order to be positioned to manage SCRM beyond first-tier supplier, focal organizations have 
to be either “controlling” or “cooperative”.  
Thankfully, the stances described in Table 13: The four stances within SCRM beyond first-tier 
suppliers (own production) are not constant, and we would argue that companies currently in 
the “dependent” or “trusting” categories would benefit from transitioning to a cooperative or 
controlling stance. Which one of the two categories focal companies should aspire to is not 
clear-cut. While a cooperative approach, may reduce the cost of the supply chains SCRM efforts 
by that the companies involved share costs and responsibilities, it may also promote 
opportunism as each company place a higher importance on managing risks that are more 
critical to them. 
 
 
Figure 8: SCRM stance-mobility 
For “dependent” focal companies, there are two transition-opportunities, first of which is to 
propose sharing the cost-and responsibility of SCRM with the first-tier suppliers in exchange 
for access. The second is through using “extension of power-network” as a balancing operation 
to shift power in the buyer-supplier relationship (Emerson 1962). It is worth noting that the 
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applicability of both these strategies relies on favorable external circumstances, and that there 
are therefore situations where “Dependent” organizations have no mobility. For “trusting” 
companies, a change in attitudes towards SCRM is needed in order for the company to position 
itself in such a way that SCRM is possible. However, a change in attitude, followed by a 
realization of inability to gain access would represent a lateral shift into the “Dependent” 
category.  
 
Value and profits 
In our findings, there were cases where focal firms chose not to conduct SCRM beyond first-
tier suppliers because it was not considered a “value-adding activity” and thus not worth 
spending time and money on in the eyes of stakeholders. The common denominator for these 
cases is that they either were in industries with low margins, or had struggled financially in the 
last few years. Even if the claim that SCRM is not value-adding was true, the potential of SCRM 
to reduce cost related to disruptions, lower inventory buffers, product recalls, and belated 
deliveries should be enough to convince both management and shareholders of its potential to 
increase profits. Furthermore, it is worth noting that for companies that are already struggling 
financially and lack solidity, the consequences of disruptions could be more critical to the 
organization, thus suggesting that the benefits from SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers is even 
higher in these cases. As stated in chapter 4.3.5: 
 
“A focal company which cannot afford the expense of conducting SCRM, can neither 
afford the consequences of large-scale disruptions to its supply chain or continuous 
sub-standard performance” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impediments  
Visibility and transparency  
One challenge within SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers is that the transparency and visibility 
of the process is reduced when many people, business functions and companies share 
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responsibility for it. We find that low degrees of transparency and visibility in the SCRM-
process hinders coordination and can create several undesirable results including overlapping 
procedures and monitoring-gaps. The effects are thereby both financial, by increasing the 
overall expenditure of the supply chain on SCRM, and quality-related by creating unrecognized 
gaps in SCRM efforts.  
 
In order to create a joint SCRM approach that does not promote these disadvantageous effects 
information sharing is key. Thus, we support the findings on the positive effects of information 
sharing on coordination (Skilton and Robinson 2009) and visibility (Christopher and Lee 2015). 
Relevant information to share within the supply chain on SCRM efforts include risk-evaluations 
of suppliers, information on what procedures are put in place to reduce risk- and of the 
responsible person/team. Furthermore, the information about these issues should be updated on 
a regular basis, in order to maintain its relevance as a decision aid. The introduction of an IT-
system to store and structure all this data would facilitate better use of the information shared 
in the supply chain. Research shows that this can be accomplished despite of unbalanced power 
relationships (Xiao, Xie, and Hu 2013). 
 
The selection problem  
The basis for problems of selection are resource constraints and supply chain complexity which 
makes it infeasible to instigate procedures for reducing SCR in at every tier of the supply chain, 
for every conceivable risk element-  and product. It can apply to either products or sub-
suppliers, and is closely related to “risk assessment”, which is discussed in detail in chapter 5.3. 
 
Our findings suggest that criticality is the most compelling criteria for selecting focus-areas, 
which is in-line with the findings of Ellis, Henry, and Shockley (2010) on that a lack of 
substitutes - and the criticality of a product for the buyer is positively related to the impact of 
supply chain disruption. It also fits into existing theory of that the level of supplier criticality 
depends on sourcing optionality (Wagner and Bode 2008).  
 
Although criticality should be of paramount importance when selecting which products and 
sub-suppliers to focus SCRM efforts on, purchasing value may also be important when it 
constitutes a major share of total purchasing value. The reason for this is that although there 
may exist substitute-products or alternative sub-suppliers, even a brief discontinuation would 
still have a significant financial impact. This perspective is captured in Ericsson`s Business 
79 
 
Interruption Value (BIV), which appears to be a viable decision-support tool, especially in cases 
where calculating the accurate probability of a risk-incident is not possible (Norrman and 
Jansson 2004).  
 
After solving the selection problems, focal organizations have to determine which risk-
reduction- and/or mitigation strategies to put into place. While most of these strategies are risk-
specific, therefore difficult to make any general recommendations on, our findings on 
contingency planning deserves elaboration. Within the sample of our research there were 
several cases where finding alternative suppliers was a stated strategy to mitigate the effect of 
disruption risk. However, no one expressed that they assessed the capacity of said suppliers.  
 
When developing contingency plans for supplier- or sub-supplier failure or disruption it is not 
enough to simply identify an alternate source of supply, as this new entity would need to have 
enough capacity to serve the needs of the supply chain. After identifying the alternate source of 
supply, the focal company should preferably secure capacity with the supplier by contract. The 
necessity of securing capacity is very visible when we examine the case of the phone producer 
Ericsson, who experienced major disruptions to their supply of radio-frequency chips after a 
fire in a supplier production facility. The same supplier was used by Nokia, a competitor who 
were able to reconfigure by securing capacity of an alternative supplier the moment news 
reached them of the fire. When Ericsson realized the extent of the disruption, the alternative 
supplier did not have spare capacity to cover their production volume (Jansson and Norrman 
2004). If it is not possible to secure the capacity of an alternative sub-supplier or supplier 
proactively by contract, early-warning mechanisms should be put in place to make sure the 
focal company and other businesses in their supply chain can react to a disruption more rapidly 
than competing firms.   
 
Based on the problems and solutions discussed in this chapter we propose an illustrative step-
by-step model with feedback loops for how focal companies can manage SCR beyond tier-one 
suppliers in Appendix B: SCRM process diagram    
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Chapter 6    
Implications and Conclusions 
6.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the research as well as our conclusions regarding the 
theoretical- and managerial implications of our findings. In addition, the chapter recognizes 
the limitations of the study and suggest various avenues for future research.  
6.2  Research summary 
The main objective of this research has been to explore how focal companies can manage SCR 
beyond first-tier suppliers in the supply chain, and by doing so contributing to closing a research 
gap within SCRM.  
 
Our findings span different theoretical concepts within SCRM including visibility, information 
sharing, monitoring, risk assessment, strategic sourcing and others. All of which are important 
steps for conducting SCRM beyond tier-one suppliers.  
 
Visibility 
Buying organizations have varying degrees of visibility into the identity and operations of sub-
suppliers. However, more have information of identity than operations. As for having intricate 
knowledge about the operations of sub-suppliers there seems to be a correlation between focal 
firm having intricate knowledge and the amount of suppliers. Where the extent of the supply 
network is relatively low, the focal organization has intricate knowledge about all sub-suppliers 
operations, while more extensive supply networks necessitates the selection of a sub-set of 
suppliers due to restrictions of cost, time and manpower. Complete SCV is necessary for 
companies in order to uncover and adequately assess SCR. 
  
 
 
 
Risk assessment 
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Criticality is a key concept when it comes to risk assessment beyond first-tier suppliers, and 
since the companies do not place equal importance on all types of risk, it becomes advantageous 
to have an assessment tool that allows the focal company to incorporate their own perceived 
criticality. Relevant elements for determining criticality includes the availability of alternative 
sources of supply and financial impact. Calculating a CRS for each sub-supplier based on 
multiplying criticality with probability for each type of risk may be helpful in solving selection 
problems.  
 
Monitoring 
There are numerous ways to monitor sub-suppliers, and it seems to be situational how 
companies approach monitoring. Factors such as the industry firms operate in, power-
dependency relationship between focal firm and its suppliers, criticality of the product, as well 
as available resources are factors that decide to what extent firms monitor sub-suppliers. 
Behavioral monitoring is necessary to obtain sufficient depth of information regarding sub-
suppliers. Ex-ante screening, has a moderating effect on the need for monitoring, but cannot 
replace it. The same is true for output monitoring, which can be a useful “second best option”.   
 
Challenges- and solutions to SCRM 
The main challenges to SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers include access to information, cost, 
selection problems, lacking technical knowledge and low supply chain transparency. The 
challenges are diverse in nature, grounded in different theories and require distinctly separate 
solutions, such as increasing visibility, positioning the firm as either “controlling” or 
“cooperative” and having open channels of communication.  
 
6.3 Theoretical contribution and implications  
This study makes extensive contributions to SCRM theory as well as extensions to existing 
theory about how to research SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers.  
Our research shows that certain forms of risk does not equally effect each tier of the supply 
chain, thus exemplifying why focal organizations needs to be involved in SCRM throughout 
the supply chain irrespective of the level of trust they have in suppliers. Ref. Figure 3: The 
visibility frontier and its potential effect on risk detection.  
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In terms of SCV, we reaffirm the importance of visibility as a decision-support tool for 
mitigating supply chain risk, thereby concurring with existing SCRM research such as (Nguyen 
et al. 2017; Nooraie and Mellat Parast 2015). We also show that visibility is a determinant for 
whether or not a focal organization can manage SCR beyond first-tier suppliers, and that 
assessing SCV is therefore a natural starting point for researchers examining SCRM.   
 
The study contributes to both Power Dependence Theory, TCT and SET by showing the 
usefulness of each approach in researching SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers. By using all of 
these theories, we developed a categorization of stances held by focal organizations regarding 
SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers.  
 
By evaluating how buying organizations assess risk and comparing this to Eriksson’s “best 
practice”, we have established “criticality” as the most important factor. Furthermore, we find 
that when using the risk-assessments to solve selection-problems, both calculating CRS and 
BIV are good approaches. Which one to use depends on the information available to an 
organization. Where the probability of each risk element unfolding can be calculated with 
reasonable accuracy, our findings suggest using CRS, while BIV can be used where this is not 
the case.    
 
Contributing to extant theory on monitoring, our research suggest that behavioral monitoring is 
necessary for the focal company to access sufficient information on sub-supplier practices to 
uncover- and discourage opportunism. This supports Maestrini et al's. (2018) view of a positive 
relationship between monitoring on opportunism, while opposing (Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 
2007). While we find that while output monitoring cannot replace behavioral monitoring, it can 
be helpful in assessing, and mediating risk originating in the lower tiers of the supply chain if 
the focal company traces the root causes of deviations. 
    
The implications of this study rests on its ability to initiate the process of filling the research 
gap on SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers. Through elucidating ways to adapt extant theory to 
researching risk in the lower-tiers of supply chains and discovering how buying firms conduct 
the SCRM-process, this thesis presents a great reference-work that other researchers can use 
for hypothesis-generation and inspiration for further research into the field.  
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6.4  Managerial implications 
Monitoring the sub-suppliers provide valuable information to the focal firm, without 
monitoring it is difficult for managers to ensure that sub-suppliers fulfill their obligations and 
contracts. This thesis contains several findings worth considering for managers. These findings 
are relevant not only to the firms included in our sample but also transferrable to other firms 
that seek to manage SCRM, regardless of industry.  
 
The first consideration is that criticality should be one of the main decision-variables when 
choosing whom to monitor. To determine the criticality, firms should implement a CRS, based 
on their own perceptions of risk. The CRS score makes it easier to prioritize which sub-suppliers 
to focus on, and which suppliers that impose the most risk to the company’s operations. 
 
To manage SCRM beyond the first-tier, the bare minimum for the focal company is to know 
the identity of the sub-suppliers. However, to tackle the apparent risks, firms should monitor 
their sub-suppliers. Firms that have limited resources should at least strive to impose self-
evaluation forms on their sub-suppliers or organize with their tier-one supplier to gather 
relevant information for their convenience. However, firms that have the opportunity should 
combine the aforementioned self-evaluations with more extensive monitoring efforts, e.g. 
audits and witness points, which will provide a more holistic picture of the situation, making it 
easier to manage SCR.   
 
In a SCRM beyond first-tier supplier context, trust is an important aspect, as the degree of trust 
the focal firm has in its first-tier supplier could potentially determine the necessity to manage 
sub-supplier risks themselves, or if they can assign the first-tier supplier to do so. Teng and Das 
(2013) research on trust and control in creating cooperation finds that trust may reduce the need 
for complex contracts, but at the same time, a well-defined contract may reduce the need for 
trust. If the focal firm choose to outsource the monitoring or risk management responsibility to 
a first-tier supplier, we argue that it is important that both “affective trust” and “trust in 
competence” is present. The former emphasizing openness, mutual understanding and honesty, 
while the latter focus on the sub-suppliers capabilities, acknowledging their skills and expertise. 
Trust is something that develops over time, and is not constant; therefore, the measures of 
control managers implement should also differ over time.  
84 
 
In the early stages of trust development, it is rational to utilize contracts to increase the control. 
When the suppliers have proven themselves and trust is established, it is possible to rely more 
on trust than contracts. 
 
We argue that there is a symbiotic relationship between SCRM beyond tier-one suppliers and 
sustainability. If a focal organization builds visibility in the supply chain to reduce risk, the 
information gathered may also be relevant for evaluating environmental- and social 
sustainability in the lower tiers of the supply chain. Consequently, the companies who actively 
conducts SCRM will accrue lower costs from ensuring sustainability in the supply chain than 
other organizations. Furthermore, several determinants of successful sustainability 
management, e.g. strategy alignment and risk perception (Leppelt et al. 2013), mirror our 
findings for SCRM. This strengthens the case for conducting sustainability and SCRM 
synchronously.   
 
Managing risk beyond first-tier suppliers impose challenges to the managers. The challenges 
are diverse in nature, and require different risk management approaches. However, for the firms 
to manage risk, they need to positions themselves correctly. Firms who seek to manage SCR 
beyond tier-one should strive to position themselves in either a “cooperative” or “controlling” 
category. Those firms who are in the “dependent” category can try to convince their first-tier 
supplier that SCRM further upstream is important and beneficial for both parties. If this 
approach is not successful, “dependent” firms could look for other suppliers willing to conduct 
SCRM in cooperation with them. If they are able to find new suppliers and find themselves 
having more power in this relationship, it is possible to dictate terms, as the “controlling” firm 
can overcome the resistance of their “dependent” supplier. However, if the firm are unable to 
establish new suppliers nor convince the existing supplier to share cost and collaborate, the 
dependent focal firm are limited in its abilities. 
 
For “trusting” companies, a change in attitudes towards SCRM is a prerequisite for the company 
to position itself in such a way that SCRM is possible. At this point, they might discover the 
possibilities of cooperation with their first-tier suppliers and establish SCRM initiatives. They 
might also be “controlling” the first-tier supplier if the external environment allows them too, 
and force SCRM strategies upon their suppliers and sub-suppliers. However, they might 
discover that their first-tier supplier are unwilling to conduct SCRM beyond first-tier suppliers, 
and that they cannot affect that decision.  
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If this is the case, they are not “controlling” anymore, but rather “dependent”, with the same 
aforementioned transitioning opportunities as those firms in the “dependent” category found in 
Figure 8: SCRM stance-mobility. 
 
6.5  Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
In order to provide other researchers and readers the chance to evaluate the quality and future 
use of this thesis, this sections presents areas that provide opportunities for further research.  
 
First, there are opportunities for future researchers to increase the literal replication, by 
increasing the number of cases. Therefore, we suggests that future researchers expand the case 
study cope, for example, by increasing the cases to five different industries with five companies 
in each industry to ensure that the results are significant.  
 
Second, the study did not focus on a specific risk category but rather those risks our sample 
stated were most apparent to them. For future research, it would be interesting to go more in 
depth on each risk-type, for example quality risks, social risks and upstream disruption risks. 
This could provide better insights to why certain risks affect different industries, and how the 
companies can handle those risks. 
 
Third, emerging technologies e.g. blockchain could affect the widespread traceability in a 
supply chain, trust between entities, and alter how modern contracting are conducted (Francisco 
and Swanson 2018). For future research, it would be interesting to see if some of these 
technologies could have a mitigating effect on SCRM beyond-first-tier suppliers.  
 
Fourth, the study is based only on buying firms and thus lacks perspective of supplier firms. By 
only focusing on the buyers, we get one participants view of the situation. Suppliers and sub-
suppliers could provide important information to better understand the whole situation, and 
allow us to get both sides view on different situations and issues. Future research may consider 
involving both buyer and suppliers in a study to get a more holistic understanding of SCRM 
beyond first-tier suppliers.  
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Fifth, the study is based on the present and previous experiences of the case companies 
regarding SCRM beyond tier-one and thus it does not capture the evolution of approaches to 
risk management. Future studies may consider deploying longitudinal design that will allow 
tracking changes in risk management approaches over time. 
 
Sixth, the findings of our study suggests that managing risks associated with sub-suppliers is 
generally useful, the study did not set out to quantify the benefits of managing risk beyond tier-
one suppliers. Future research may consider comparing performance of firms that manage risks 
associated with their sub-suppliers versus those that do not, and measure the effect of specific 
SCRM strategies. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: interview-guide. 
 
The interview-guide presented below is the standardized semi-structured interview guide used 
with minor adjustments in all case-interviews.  
 
Interview-guide 
 
1. In short, can you describe your business, and what kind of products and services you 
procure?    
 
2. What does your supply chain look like? Is it stable or volatile?  
 
3. What kinds of risk do you experience in relation to your company’s operations?  
-Especially connected to sourcing and procurement  
 
4. Is there a framework for how to evaluate risk?  
 
Visibility 
1. Do you know who your sub-suppliers are?  
 
2. How would you describe your relationship with these?  
 
3. Is there any information-flow between you and your sub-suppliers? If so, how does it 
happen?  
 
4. Why would knowing your sub-suppliers and eventual risk associated with them be of 
interest for companies? Which benefits do you see?   
 
How can companies monitor sub-supplier performance? 
1.) Which operations/activities would be relevant to monitor? 
 
2.)  What are the potential gains from monitoring sub-supplier performance and 
operations?  
 
102 
 
3.) How can/should the monitoring be organized? Self-evaluation, through subsequent 
tier in the supply chain , by the buying firm or by a third party?  
 
Information flow. 
1) If a sub-supplier detects an emergent risk which may influence your company, how 
do you imagine this information would reach you? 
2) What information would you be interested in receiving from your sub-suppliers?  
 
3) Would the relationship between you and your suppliers influence the experienced 
need for monitoring and control? If so, which factors would be relevant? 
(relationship length, same nationality, historic performance 
 
4) Will the importance, value or complexity of a product have an effect on which control 
measures are put in place, and the extent of these?   
 
1) What do you perceive to be the greatest challenges when it comes to managing risk 
related to sub-suppliers?  
- Have you experienced any such challenges recently?    
- If so, how did you overcome them? 
 
2) Do you have a framework for how to react to/handle risk?  
Ex. Criticality matrix 
 
3) How would you describe the relative power between you and your suppliers?  
 
4) How dependent are your suppliers on you, and vice versa? (In terms of size, sales 
volume and alternative suppliers/customers).  
Contract-related 
1)  
In your experience, when you procure products from a supplier, is it usual/feasible to dictate 
guidelines for the supplier’s sourcing?  
- How about other types of clauses regarding requirements for security stock, 
storage financial security etc.?  
 
 
GENERAL EXPERT QUESTIONS 
1. Should companies conduct risk-related work aimed at suppliers beyond the first-tier? 
If so, in which circumstances, and by what measures?  
 
Is there anything you would like to add?  
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Would it be possible for us to look at one of “X’”s contracts with one of its supplier 
(active or inactive)?  
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Appendix B: SCRM process diagram 
 
Based on our findings from case interviews, best practices and existing SCRM literature, we 
propose a model for how companies can manage SCR beyond first-tier suppliers: 
 
 
Figure 9: SCRM process diagram 
 
The process begins with “positioning” and involves placing the focal organization in a 
position where SCRM is possible. This equals either a “control” or “cooperative stance as 
shown in Figure 8: SCRM stance-mobility. 
The next step is to map out the supply chain, uncovering the identity and processes of each 
actor at every level of the supply chain before running a risk analysis that should include both 
an analysis of the external environment of the sub-suppliers and criticality of different types 
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of risk and products. By collecting the risk assessments in a database, the focal organization 
can sort sub-suppliers by ether CRS or BIV, thus selecting what and who to focus SCRM-
efforts on.  
The next step is to develop mitigation strategies and contingency plans aimed at reducing the 
level of SCR to an acceptable level. After implementing these solutions, the organization 
should reevaluate the risk-level and conclude on whether risk has been lowered to an 
acceptable level. It this is the case, the SCRM-process starts over again in the case of changes 
in the supply chain or external environment. If not, new mitigation strategies should be 
implemented.  
 
 
 
